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1  
INVITING SCRUTINY: HOW TECHNOLOGIES ARE ERODING 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
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the Attorney-Client Privilege, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2013), available at 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i1/article2.pdf. 
 
The attorney-client privilege is sacrosanct, but its protections are eroding.  
Always narrowly construed, its zone of protection is becoming even 
smaller, particularly for in-house counsel.  This is due to organizations’ 
inability to address the impact that technological innovations have had on 
the privilege.  In many instances, new and disruptive technologies are 
assaulting the privilege as a result of unsuspecting corporate practices.  
This Article details how technology advancements coupled with 
heightened judicial scrutiny have chipped away at the protections the 
privilege affords to internal counsel.  The historical basis for increased 
court scrutiny of in-house counsel’s privilege claims is detailed.  With 
respect to technology, e-mail is spotlighted as a principal causation 
element in this process.1  In addition, the Article explores how social 
networking sites, cloud computing, and corporate “bring your own 
device” policies all have the potential to undermine the privilege 
assertions of in-house counsel.  Finally, some best practices are discussed 
which, if followed, can help prevent further erosions to such claims. 
 
                                                         
* Senior Discovery Counsel, Recommind, Inc; J.D., Santa Clara University School of 
Law, 1999; B.A., Political Science, Brigham Young University, 1994.  The author wishes 
to recognize Adam Kuhn, J.D./M.B.A., University of San Francisco School of Law, 
2013, for his exceptional work in connection with this article. 
 
1 See Tom Spahn, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in the Digital Age: War on Two 
Fronts?, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 288, 293 (2011). 
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2  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Technology has certainly been a game-changer for the attorney-
client relationship.2  In particular, digital age innovations have facilitated 
communication between organizations and their lawyers.3  While 
messaging was previously limited to traditional options such as telephone 
calls, paper letters, and facsimiles,4 lawyers and clients now enjoy an 
abundance of media through which they can instantaneously exchange 
information.5  Besides e-mail,6 companies and counsel now trade 
                                                        
2 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a 
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 674-75 (2010) (arguing that technology can facilitate 
compliance and present “catastrophic dangers” in the financial services industry). 
 
3 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2007) (detailing 
the role of e-mail in facilitating the communication process between lawyer and client). 
 
4 Ben Delsa, E-mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Simple E-mail in Confidence, 59 
LA. L. REV. 935, 935-36 (1999) (“Unlike telephone calls, e-mail creates written records 
of communications, and allows users to send large documents and images by attaching 
them to the e-mail message . . . [and] avoids ‘telephone tag’ . . . . In contrast to facsimile 
transmission, e-mail can send information directly from a computer in a form that the 
recipient can edit and return . . . [and] costs less than a fax, especially when used for 
interstate or international communication.”).  
 
5 See id. at 935 (attributing the widespread use of e-mail to “its unique advantages over 
other forms of communication.  E-mail documents cost less to store, can be edited and 
efficiently searched, and can disseminate information to several destinations at once.”). 
 
6 See Harry M. Gruber, E-mail: The Attorney-Client Privilege Applied, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 624, 626-27 (1998) (noting, in 1998, that many lawyers were already relying on e-
mail as a form of communication with clients); Gil Keteltas & John Rosenthal, Discovery 
of Electronic Evidence, in ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 4 (2d ed. 2008) 
(“E-mails have replaced other forms of communication besides just paper-based 
communication.  Many informal messages that were previously relayed by telephone or 
at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail.” (quoting Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 
8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002))). 
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messages through short message service,7 instant messages, social 
networking sites,8 and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP).9  The methods 
for doing so have also expanded, with small form factor (SFF) devices 
such as smartphones and tablet computers replacing desktop computers 
and other antiquated tools.10  And with the proliferation of cloud 
computing, both client and counsel essentially have an unlimited virtual 
warehouse in which to store their digital discussions.11 
 
[2] Yet these same technological innovations also present a myriad of 
complications for the lawyer-client relationship.12  For example, such                                                         
7 See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, Text Messages: Digital Lipstick on the Collar, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/09text.html (discussing the role of text 
messages in family law). 
 
8 Social media communications are requested for production at least forty-one percent of 
the time.  Press Release, Symantec, Symantec Survey Finds Emails are No Longer the 
Most Commonly Specified Documents in eDiscovery Requests (Sept. 19, 2011), 
available at www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20110918_01.  
 
9 See Robert Hardaway et al., E-Discovery’s Threat to Civil Litigation: Reevaluating Rule 
26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 553-54 (2011) (noting that some 
organizations have begun recording a variety of audio communications). 
 
10 See Pedro Pavon, Risky Business: “Bring-Your-Own-Device” and Your Company, 
BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2013, at 1, 1-3 available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/09/01_pavon.html;  David J. Walton, 
‘Bring Your Own Device’ to Work Carries Data Security Risks, LAW TECH. NEWS (Sept. 
6, 2012), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202570405609 
(highlighting data security as a primary BYOD risk, especially when personal cloud 
storage is involved). 
 
11  See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy 
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1200 (2010). 
 
12 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) 
(discussing the challenges of maintaining confidentiality in electronic communications), 
available at 
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technologies and others have opened the proverbial floodgates of 
electronically stored information (“ESI”). This deluge of ESI has 
inundated the electronic information systems of enterprises and law firms, 
creating complexity for both client and counsel in establishing effective 
information retention and discovery response strategies.13 
 
[3] Another such challenge arises from the ability that third parties 
now have to mine metadata from various software applications.14 
Metadata—the embedded text that provides key details about the nature of 
ESI—is a powerful tool for understanding the who, what, when, and 
where of a particular document.  However, unless appropriate precautions 
are taken, metadata also poses a technological trap as confidential client 
information could be exposed to the other side.15 
 
[4] Despite the significance of these and other issues, they are 
secondary to the impact that technology has unintentionally had on the 
attorney-client privilege (“privilege”).16  As both a procedural rule and an                                                                                                                                           
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
11_459_nm_formal_opinion.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 
13 See generally Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: Has The Rule 37(e) Safe 
Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
317 (2010) (detailing the data governance challenges that organizations face from the 
information explosion). 
 
14 Adjoa Linzy, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Discovery of Electronically Stored 
Information, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, ¶¶ 15, 33-38 (2011) (detailing, among other 
things, the logistical challenges that metadata poses for maintaining the privileged nature 
of communications between client and counsel). 
 
15 See Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining 
Metadata, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 4-5, 7-10 (2007) (discussing the nature, 
significance, and hazards of metadata). 
 
16 See Acosta v. Target Corp., No. 05 C 7068, 281 F.R.D. 314, 322 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
(observing that “[t]he complications in analyzing the attorney-client privilege for a 
corporation have been multiplied by the advent of ESI.”). 
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evidentiary hurdle that excludes relevant information from legal 
proceedings, strong policy reasons have traditionally mandated that the 
privilege be narrowly construed.17  That limited scope of protection 
continues to shrink as technologies provide unexpected transparency into 
the zone of confidential exchanges between clients and lawyers.18  
 
[5] The phenomenon of increased transparency has had a far greater 
impact on the privilege claims of in-house counsel than on outside 
counsel.19  This is because courts already scrutinize in-house privilege 
claims to a greater degree than those of their outside counterparts.20  
Given the dual roles that internal counsel typically have as both legal and 
business advisors for their client organizations, courts now apply 
heightened scrutiny to their privilege assertions to ensure that only legal 
advice is shielded from disclosure.21  Courts have justified such disparate 
treatment as necessary to more readily detect whether companies are                                                         
17 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc. (Oracle I), No. C-10-03561-WHA DMR, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011) (citing Vasudevan Software v. 
IBM Corp., No. 09-5897-RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47764 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 
2011)) aff’d, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 
2011), aff’d, In re Google Inc., 462 Fed. Appx. 975, 977-78 (Fed. Circ. 2012). 
 
18 See discussion infra Parts III and IV. 
 
19 See B.F.G. of Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99-C-4604, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18930, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001) (criticizing the defendants’ “use of in-house 
counsel to give a veneer of privilege to otherwise non-privileged business 
communications”). 
 
20 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1721, 1727 (2005) (“In practice, however, courts tend to apply more scrutiny to 
communication with in-house counsel . . .”); Todd Presnell, A Higher Standard Claiming 
Attorney-Client Privilege Is Tougher for In-House Counsel, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 
2005, at 19, 21-23 (“Nevertheless, in-house lawyers will receive greater scrutiny from 
courts . . . when they attempt to invoke the attorney-client privilege”). 
 
21 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a clear 
showing was required to establish the privilege since the company general counsel also 
had “certain responsibilities outside the lawyer’s sphere”). 
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trying to inoculate ordinary business records from discovery by funneling 
them through their in-house lawyers.  Indeed, judicial concern over such a 
“zone of silence” in discovery is one of the principal reasons why the 
privilege assertions of in-house lawyers are handled so differently.22  That 
scrutiny, however, has become further magnified as new and disruptive 
technologies23 have removed the veneer of confidentiality from messages 
that, rightly or wrongly, would have been immune from discovery in the 
halcyon days of analog communications.24  E-mail is perhaps the most 
glaring example of this development. 
 
[6]  E-mail is a helpful yet particularly troublesome innovation 
because it provides a written record of internal corporate discussions 
involving counsel that, until recently, did not exist.25  Those messages—
which reflect legal counsel, business advice,26 or both—are often in play 
during litigation due to the inclusion of counsel on non-privileged e-
                                                        
22 See David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE 
L.J. 953, 955 (1956) (warning that overreaching privilege claims could result in a “zone 
of silence” in which non-privileged documents are improperly withheld from discovery). 
 
23 See Spahn, supra note 1, at 293 (“The advent of electronic communications has greatly 
complicated the application of the attorney-client privilege, particularly for in-house 
counsel”). 
 
24 See PAUL RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 250-51 (2d ed. 2008) 
(describing some differences between traditional written communication and e-mail). 
 
25 See United States v. Segal, No. 02–CR–112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, at *9 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 16, 2004) (observing that “the rise of e-mail as the primary mode of corporate 
communication permits the broad dissemination and near-complete documentation of 
corporate communications,” which has forced additional complexity into the analysis of 
privilege claims involving corporate counsel). 
 
26 See Mac-Ray Corp. v. Ricotta, No. 03–CV–524S(F), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32023, at 
*8 (W.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004) (holding that no privilege attached to various internal e-
mails involving “routine business transactions” sent to corporate counsel for “review and 
approval”). 
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mails,27 tactically sanitized privilege logs,28 and undetected draft e-
mails.29  These features of e-mail all serve to undermine counsel’s 
privilege assertions.30   
 
[7] A quintessential example of the havoc that e-mail has wrought on 
such assertions is found in the recent Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. 
litigation.  In that case, Google withheld a so-called “smoking gun” e-mail 
as privileged because it was directed to an internal company lawyer.31  
Prior to the digital age, such a straightforward privilege claim may have 
been left unchallenged given the scant information typically required for a 
privilege log.32  Nevertheless, various drafts of that same e-mail,                                                         
27 See Sasha Danna, The Impact of Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the 
Applicability of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1683, 
1697 (2005) (“[C]ourts have regarded with particular skepticism claims that e-mail 
messages are subject to the attorney-client privilege because they have either been copied 
or forwarded to in-house counsel.”). 
 
28 See B.F.G. of Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99-C-4604, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18930, at *18-19 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001) (holding that certain e-mails involving in-
house counsel were not privileged and criticizing the defendants’ efforts to improperly 
“shield” those communications from discovery in their privilege log). 
 
29 Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99-C-8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32 (N.D. 
Ill. June 3, 2002) (“[C]omputers have the ability to capture several copies (or drafts) of 
the same e-mail, thus multiplying the volume of documents.  All of these e-mails must be 
scanned for both relevance and privilege.”). 
 
30 Gopal S. Patel, Note, E-mail Communication and the Attorney-Client Privilege: An 
Ethical Quagmire, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 685, 685 (2004) (“[E]-mail [] has made 
attorney-client contact communication much cheaper and easier.  However, this benefit 
comes with a significant cost.  The information that is passed on through this method of 
communication can be rather easily intercepted or inadvertently disclosed.  These 
technological advancements pose very unique challenges to both attorneys and judges.”). 
 
31 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle II), No. C-10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. 
LEXIS 121446, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
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mistakenly produced by Google, indicated that the sender actually sought 
business advice from a company executive and not legal advice from in-
house counsel.33  As a result, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling that applied heightened 
scrutiny34 and found that the e-mail was not privileged despite the 
presence of counsel.35 
 
[8] The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Oracle represents a troubling body 
of jurisprudence for organizations that are trying to protect the privilege 
claims of their corporate counsel in the face of e-mail complications.36  
Worse, however, is that this problem is not limited to e-mail.37  New 
technologies and related trends could also prove disruptive to these claims.  
 
[9] By way of example, social networking sites are an increasingly 
popular communication medium in many industry verticals, including the 
legal profession.  While many lawyers use these sites to market their 
services, others—including in-house lawyers—are using them to discuss 
legal matters with clients.38  While certain communication functionality                                                         
33 In re Google Inc. (Oracle III), 462 F. App’x 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 
34 Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *7. 
 
35 Oracle III, 462 F. App’x at 977-78. 
 
36 See Jan Conlin & Andrew Pieper, Litigation: Keeping that Corporate Privilege, 
INSIDECOUNSEL (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/09/27/litigation-
keeping-that-corporate-privilege (“[I]f In re Google is any predictor, a party claiming 
privilege needs to make a ‘clear showing’ that the involved communication relates to in-
house counsel working in her capacity as an attorney.”). 
 
37 See Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional 
Ethics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 145-146 (2011) 
(discussing the multiplicity of discovery challenges involving technologies, including text 
messages, Facebook postings, and cloud data storage). 
 
38 See, e.g., Social Media, 10-8 PARTNER'S REP., Aug. 2010, at 10, 12 (“[Seventy] percent 
of in[-]house lawyers between the ages of [thirty] and [thirty-nine] had used Facebook for 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 
9  
provided by social networks may look like e-mail,39 that functionality 
could lack the necessary confidentiality to shield otherwise privileged 
discussions from discovery.  This includes the ostensibly “private” 
messaging features available on some sites, which may be accessible to 
site representatives.40 
 
[10] Confidentiality could also become problematic where cloud 
computing is used to store the communications involving in-house 
counsel.  Despite being the in vogue repository for ESI, cloud service 
providers are third parties whose access to stored privileged messages 
could very well vitiate the required element of confidentiality.41  While 
this issue is not insurmountable for providers, it is a valid consideration 
since many offerings provide their employees with unfettered access to 
customer data.42  Unless appropriate safeguards are designed to preserve 
the confidentiality of such communications, in-house privilege claims may 
be waived. 
 
[11] New workplace practices such as “bring your own device” 
(“BYOD”) policies, which are designed for employee convenience and                                                                                                                                           
personal reasons in the previous [twenty-four] hours and that [fifty] percent had used it 
for professional reasons in the previous week.”).  
 
39 Cf. Nicholas Carlson & Kamelia Angelova, CHART OF THE DAY: Email’s Reign is 
Over, Social Networking is the New King, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2010, 4:11 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-social-networking-vs-email-usage-
2010-4 (showing that social media usage has exceeded e-mail use since 2007). 
 
40 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 
41 See CARLA R. WALWORTH ET AL., PRIVILEGE LAW, ITS GLOBAL APPLICATION, AND THE 
IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 8-10 (2012), available at 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/young_lawyer/attorneyclientprivileg
e.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing recent case law regarding discovery and privilege on 
cloud and social media platforms). 
 
40 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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employer cost savings, could also present a host of inconvenient and 
costly problems for in-house privilege claims.43  This is because BYOD 
may cause companies to cede a significant aspect of control from 
employer to employee.44  Without layering in adequate protections, that 
lack of control could jeopardize confidentiality if employees use personal 
cloud storage platforms for the transmission or storage of company data.45  
In addition, confidentiality could be compromised depending on the nature 
of access that the employee’s family and friends have to the device.46 
 
[12] In summary, heightened scrutiny and technological innovations are 
inviting further judicial probing of internal counsel’s privilege claims.  In 
this Article, I review these phenomena, the challenges they pose for 
establishing the defensibility of in-house privilege claims, and actionable 
insights for doing so.  In Part II, I provide an overview of the privilege and 
detail through both jurisprudence and legal scholarship the increased 
scrutiny that courts apply to such claims.  Part III analyzes a series of 
cases that describe how the proliferation of e-mail has caused a 
corresponding rise in judicial scrutiny toward in-house privilege 
assertions.  Part IV delves into the common yet respective problems that 
social networks, cloud computing, and BYOD present for such assertions.  
In Part V, I offer some actionable suggestions for addressing the foregoing 
problems.                                                         
43 Cf. Pragati Jain, BYOD: Bring Your Own Device . . . or Disaster? MAASTERS CENTER 
(July 20, 2012), www.maas360.com/maasters/blog/trendsandtechnology/byod-bring-
your-own-device-disaster/ (noting concerns created by BYOD programs, including data 
security and the ease of accessibility for non-employees). 
 
44 See Stephen S. Wu, Managing an Enterprise Mobile Device Program, THE CORP. 
COUNS. NEWSL., Feb. 1, 2013, 
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_corpcounselor/27_2/news/157697-
1.html. 
 
45 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 
46 See id. 
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II. THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY APPLIED TO IN-HOUSE 
COUNSEL’S PRIVILEGE CLAIMS 
 
[13] To grasp how technology is inviting greater scrutiny of the 
privilege claims of internal counsel, it is important to understand the shift 
in traditional judicial thinking regarding such claims.  The trend of 
heightened scrutiny toward those assertions is now firmly established in 
American jurisprudence, though it may come as a surprise that things were 
not always this way.  Indeed, prior to 1984, in-house lawyers’ privilege 
claims were generally treated with the same level of scrutiny as those of 
their law firm counterparts, despite their multifaceted roles as legal 
counselor and business advisor.47 
 
[14] That doctrine was memorialized in the seminal 1950 opinion of 
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.48 and was consistently 
followed for most of the next three decades.  The sea change on this issue 
arrived in 1984 with the issuance of In re Sealed Case by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.49  From that time, courts 
steadily incorporated then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s reasoning that a 
clear showing is required to establish the bona fides of in-house counsel’s 
privilege claims.50  In fact, such a standard is now the unqualified majority 
rule.51 
 
                                                        
47 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 
48 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). 
 
49 In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 98-9 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 
50 Id. at 101. 
 
51 See PAUL R. RICE, 2 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES §7:2 (2d. 
ed. 2010). 
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[15] In this Part, I analyze the shifting judicial approach to in-house 
privilege claims, beginning with an overview of the privilege, its purposes, 
and the scope of this exclusionary rule.  Included in this discussion is an 
analysis of the disparate treatment currently applied to such in-house 
claims as opposed to those of firm lawyers.  I next describe the historical 
evolution of the “clear showing” rule. Starting with United Shoe, I follow 
the progression of the rule through Sealed Case and then detail how the 
clear showing standard has permeated contemporary jurisprudence.  I 
conclude this Part by briefly introducing the correlation between 
technology and the increasing scrutiny that courts apply to internal 
lawyers’ claims. 
 
A.  The Privilege—Purposes, Policy and Scope 
 
[16] The privilege certainly has achieved a venerated status in the 
United States.  Hailed as one of the lynchpins of the adversary system, it 
has been called everything from “sacred”52 and “sacrosanct”53 to 
“essential”54 and “compellingly important.”55  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has repeatedly defended the privilege and its purpose of ensuring “full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients,” declaring it to 
be critical to the “administration of justice.”56  Moreover, the concept of 
privilege has transcended the legal profession and permeated popular                                                         
52 SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 680 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 
53 Morgan v. Montanye, 521 F.2d 693, 693 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 
54 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947)). 
 
55 Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (W.D. Mich. 
1966). 
 
56 Upjohn Corp. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (observing that the “purpose” 
of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and 
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”). 
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culture.57  Over the decades, movies, television, and literature have 
touched on the scope, impact, and need for the privilege.58 
 
[17] To be sure, not all commentary about the privilege has been 
positive or laudatory.59  The privilege has been criticized for its obvious 
exclusionary results,60 for where the privilege applies, relevant evidence is 
excluded from proceedings.61  Given these zero-sum consequences, some 
have even argued that the scope of the privilege should be severely 
curtailed or even eliminated to better ensure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of legal proceedings.62                                                         
57 See Michael Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the Client Is 
Guilty: Client Confessions in Legal Ethics, Popular Culture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 229, 248-52 (2009) (discussing the attorney-client privilege in popular 
culture and literature). 
 
58 See, e.g., movieclips, The Lincoln Lawyer (7/11) Movie Clip – Attorney-Client 
Privilege (2011) HD, YOUTUBE (May 17, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lfCVS3HWdjg; CBS, The Good Wife – Attorney 
Client Privilege, MOVIEWEB (Mar. 24, 2013), 
http://www.movieweb.com/tv/TEmV1ZDHjFAiqp/attorney-client-privilege. 
 
59 See Note, Functional Overlap Between The Lawyer And Other Professionals: Its 
Implications For The Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L. J. 1226, 1236-37 
(1962) [hereinafter Functional Overlap] (discussing criticisms of the privilege and 
commentators who have sought to limit its application). 
 
60 See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 425-26 (1970) [hereinafter The Control Group Test] (noting the 
obvious exclusionary results that the privilege causes in discovery). 
 
61 See Lory A. Barsdate, Attorney-Client Privilege For The Government Entity, 97 YALE. 
L. J. 1725, 1729 (1988) (discussing how the privilege prevents the presentation of 
relevant evidence to a jury). 
 
62 See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1982) (observing that the privilege’s “staunchest 
proponents concede that, whenever the privilege is invoked, otherwise relevant and 
admissible evidence may be suppressed . . . . [and] potentially hinders the administration 
of justice.”). 
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[18] To balance these valid yet countervailing considerations, courts 
have been directed to carefully examine all of the circumstances 
surrounding a privilege claim.63  To enable this result and to eliminate the 
possibility that courts could get locked into rigid procedural requirements, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 directs courts to evaluate privilege 
assertions based on existing common law principles.64  Indeed, nearly four 
decades ago, Congress declined to codify the privilege, ostensibly so that 
courts would have the necessary flexibility to adjudicate matters of 
privilege.65 The rationale supporting the congressional rejection of a 
codified privilege rule has been ratified time and again by the Supreme 
Court, which has likewise urged trial courts to assess privilege claims on a 
case-by-case basis and not through fixed presuppositions.66 
 
B.  The Disparate Treatment of In-house Counsel’s Privilege 
Claims 
 
[19] Despite such direction from Congress and the Court, lower courts 
have nonetheless developed a framework to help evaluate whether a 
particular claim meets the requirements of the privilege.67  Under that                                                         
63 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47-48 (1980) (explaining that a privilege 
analysis requires courts to eschew rigid guidelines given changing cultural norms and the 
factually intensive nature of such claims). 
 
64 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 
65 See generally United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980) (discussing proposed 
drafts of Rule 501 from 1973 and noting that “Congress substituted the present language 
of Rule 501 for the draft proposed by the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States to provide the courts with greater flexibility in developing rules of 
privilege on a case-by-case basis”). 
 
66 See, e.g., id. 
 
67 See, e.g., Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418, at 
*20-21 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012), modified No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
46274 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (discussing the factors which generally justify the 
application of the clear showing rule to in-house counsel’s privilege claims). 
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common law rubric, the elements of the privilege—a confidential 
communication between the client and the lawyer made for the purpose of 
obtaining a legal opinion or advice—are generally applied unequally to in-
house lawyers as opposed to outside counsel.68  While retained lawyers 
are accorded a basic presumption of privilege for their communications,69 
in-house attorneys enjoy no such presumption.70  On the contrary, their 
claims are heavily scrutinized to ensure that an organizational client is not 
hiding business advice or other non-legal considerations under the cloak of 
privilege.71  The Diversified Industries v. Meredith72 and United States v. 
Chevron Corp.73 cases are particularly instructive and representative on 
the current levels of scrutiny applied to the privilege claims of firm 
lawyers as opposed to corporate counsel. 
 
[20] In Diversified Industries, the Eighth Circuit held en banc that 
communications between a manufacturing company’s employees and the 
company’s retained law firm were protected by the privilege.74  At issue 
was whether those discussions were privileged since a three-judge panel 
previously determined that the law firm was not retained “to provide legal                                                         
68 See id. 
 
69 See United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002-
Orl-31TBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012) (observing that 
messages “between corporate client and outside litigation counsel are cloaked with a 
presumption of privilege”). 
 
70 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 
71 See id. at 798-799. 
 
72 Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601-03 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
 
73 United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C 94–1885 SBA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646, at 
*3-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996). 
 
74 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 606-07, 610-11. 
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services or advice.”75  The en banc panel rejected that decision, finding 
instead that the manufacturer engaged the law firm to provide legal advice 
relating to its investigation of alleged internal corruption.76  Central to the 
court’s holding was its reasoning that the firm was a “professional legal 
adviser.”77  Given the firm’s status as outside counsel, the court articulated 
a presumption that such communications were generally privileged: 
“Here, the matter was committed to Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, a 
professional legal adviser. Thus, it was prima facie committed for the sake 
of legal advice and was, therefore, within the privilege absent a clear 
showing to the contrary.”78  This presumption was essential to the en banc 
panel’s opposite conclusion regarding the manufacturer’s claim of 
privilege.79 
 
[21] In contrast to the favorable finding for outside counsel in 
Diversified, the holding from United States v. Chevron Corp. came down 
squarely against such a presumption for internal lawyers.80  In Chevron, 
the district court vacated a magistrate judge’s findings that protected 
scores of communications involving the defendant petroleum company’s 
in-house counsel as privileged.81  The court was particularly troubled that                                                         
75 Id. at 603, 606. 
 
76 Id. at 610. 
 
77 Id. 
 
78 Id. 
 
79 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 610-11; see also United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 
F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (reciting the general rule that a 
“[c]ommunication between a client and its outside counsel are presumed to be made for 
the purpose of obtaining legal advice.” (citing Diversified, 572 F.2d 596)). 
 
80 United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C–94–1885 SBA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154, at 
*9-10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996), modified, No. C–94–1885 SBA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8646 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 1996); cf. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611. 
 
81 Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154 at *11. 
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the magistrate “presumed” that messages involving corporate counsel 
were privileged.82  Relying on Diversified, the court reasoned that such a 
presumption was appropriate for outside counsel.83  Nevertheless, the 
court did not extend the benefit of the doubt to in-house counsel, noting 
counsel’s inextricable involvement in corporate business matters.84  To 
ensure that only legal and not business advice was protected from 
discovery, the company needed to “make a clear showing that in-house 
counsel’s advice was given in a professional legal capacity.”85 
 
[22] The Diversified and Chevron Corp. cases exemplify how 
differently the judiciary views counsel’s respective privilege claims.  For 
outside counsel, the privilege applies “absent a clear showing to the 
contrary.”86  But for in-house lawyers, the privilege does not attach unless 
a clear showing is made to justify the claim.  This stark divergence in 
treatment has been criticized as an inappropriate deviation from the 
congressional mandate regarding privilege assertions.87  It is also 
somewhat surprising given that most courts take pains to clarify that the 
clear showing standard for in-house attorneys does not dilute their status                                                         
82 Id. at *9. 
 
83 Id.at *8-9 (citing Diversified, 572 F.2d at 610). 
 
84 Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154, at *9-10. 
 
85 Id.  The matter was eventually remanded to the magistrate judge with the direction that 
he make findings consistent with the district court’s order.  Id.; see also United States v. 
Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (observing that “the 
presumption that attaches to communications with outside counsel does not extend to 
communications with in-house counsel.” (citing Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4154, at *8-11)). 
 
86 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 610. 
 
87 See, e.g., Amy L. Weiss, In-house Counsel Beware: Wearing The Business Hat Could 
Mean Losing The Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 393-94 (1998) (criticizing the 
trend of heightened scrutiny caused by the clear showing rule). 
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as professional legal advisors.88  And yet, such a standard has had 
precisely the effect of weakening in-house privilege claims since it was 
first articulated in Sealed Case in 1984.89 
 
[23] To understand how courts have justified the application of a more 
probing legal framework for analyzing such privilege assertions, it is 
worth examining the historical evolution of the clear showing rule through 
the lens of jurisprudence. A review of pertinent scholarship is also 
insightful, particularly since the seeds of heightened scrutiny were sown in 
a remarkably prescient article published by the Yale Law Journal shortly 
after the United Shoe case.90 
 
C.  From Presumptively Privileged to Heightened Scrutiny: 
How the Judiciary Arrived at the Clear Showing Rule and Its 
Impact on In-house Counsel 
 
1.  The Comparable Treatment of Lawyers’ Privilege 
Claims Under United Shoe 
 
[24] Once upon a time, the privilege claims of in-house lawyers were 
treated in the same manner as those of their law firm colleagues. Despite 
differences in the sources of their compensation, employment status, and 
the nature of their respective clients, courts considered the respective 
claims of internal and external lawyers to be equivalent since they were 
each deemed “professional legal advisors.”  No case better encapsulates 
                                                        
88 See Neuberger Berman Real Estate Income Fund, Inc. v. Lola Brown Trust, No. AMD-
04-3056, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19513, at *39 n.20 (D. Md. 2005) (explaining the 
dichotomy between courts’ stated intentions to not weaken the privilege and their 
continued application of heightened scrutiny to house privilege claims). 
 
89 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 
90 See Simon, supra note 22; discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
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that former trend than the United Shoe decision.91  Authored by the 
venerable jurist Charles Wyzanski, United Shoe was the leading case for 
decades on the privilege.92  Particularly noteworthy is Judge Wyzanski’s 
analysis regarding the comparable treatment for the privilege assertions of 
outside counsel and internal lawyers.93 
 
[25] In United Shoe, the court was asked to determine whether 
approximately 800 documents belonging to the defendant company were 
privileged.94  The documents included communications between company 
employees and the company’s retained outside counsel, along with 
internal discussions involving the company’s in-house legal advisors.95  In 
ruling that both categories of documents were generally privileged,96 the 
court observed that the claims of in-house lawyers were comparable to 
those of their law firm counterparts since each was a professional legal 
advisor: 
 
[T]he apparent factual differences between these house counsel 
and outside counsel are . . . not sufficient differences to                                                         
91 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). 
 
92 See, e.g., In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 420 (2nd Cir. 2007) (opining that certain 
of Judge Wyzanski’s observations regarding the privilege apply “with equal force 
today”). 
 
93 See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360.  
 
94 Id. at 358. 
 
95 See id. at 359.  The court also considered whether communications involving the 
company’s patent agents should be privileged.  The court declined to do so.  This aspect 
of the holding from United Shoe has been rejected in subsequent jurisprudence.  See, e.g., 
American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (summarizing criticism of the United Shoe holding that did not extend the 
privilege to patent agents). 
 
96 Id. at 359-360. 
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distinguish the two types of counsel for purposes of the attorney-
client privilege . . . . The type of service performed by house 
counsel is substantially like that performed by many members of 
the large urban law firms.  The distinction is chiefly that the 
house counsel gives advice to one regular client, the outside 
counsel to several regular clients.97 
 
Thus, the court did not make the distinction between outside and in-house 
counsel that has now become the norm in a post-Sealed Case world. 
 
[26] However, in the most critical aspect of its opinion, the court also 
reasoned that a privilege claim should not be vitiated by the presence of 
related business advice in a communication containing legal counsel. 98  
Observing that the “modern lawyer” was often forced to deal with non-
legal considerations, the court opined that “the privilege of nondisclosure 
is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly 
stated in a communication which also includes legal advice.”99  The lone 
note the court offered in this regard was that a lawyer’s communication 
involving just business advice would not be privileged.100 
 
[27] The rule from United Shoe that the privilege claims of in-house 
counsel were on par with those of outside lawyers instantly became an                                                         
97 Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
 
98 See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359.  While this explanation was provided in the 
context of outside counsel, it was subsequently applied with equal force to in-house 
counsel.  See, e.g., Chore-Time Equip. Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 
1022 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (explaining that “Judge Wyzanski was also referring to house 
counsel when he said the privilege should not be lost merely because an attorney includes 
non-legal advice with legal advice”). 
 
99 United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359. 
 
100 See id. (“Where a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion 
whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of business advice, it is not 
privileged” (citing United States v. Vehicular Parking, 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943)). 
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accepted principle.  It would endure for the next thirty-plus years as courts 
and scholarship generally acknowledged the comparative status of 
lawyers’ privilege claims, irrespective of their employer.101  Nevertheless, 
the more important notion from United Shoe was Judge Wyzanski’s dicta 
regarding the privileged status of communications that included non-legal 
advice.102  While initially accepted as a prevailing rule, such mixed 
purpose messages would come under scrutiny in the 1970s and ultimately 
prove the undoing of the equal status of in-house counsel’s privilege 
claims.103 
 
2.  The United Shoe Rule Versus Corporate Zones of 
Silence 
 
[28] A few years after the United Shoe opinion was decided, the Yale 
Law Journal published an insightful article analyzing the impact of United 
Shoe on the privilege claims of corporations.104  Recognizing that this 
aspect of privilege law was still in its nascent stage, author David Simon 
examined various scenarios relating to the scope and application of the 
privilege to organizations.  Among the issues considered in the article was 
whether the privilege claims of internal counsel should be accorded equal 
status with those of external lawyers.105 
 
[29] Simon agreed with the United Shoe principle that corporate 
lawyers’ claims should receive similar privilege protection as those of firm 
lawyers.106  Nevertheless, he also observed that the privilege might have                                                         
101 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.a. 
 
102 See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359. 
 
103 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.b. 
 
104 See generally Simon, supra note 22. 
 
105 See id. at 973. 
 
106 See id. at 970. 
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to yield in certain instances, particularly “in a case where too much 
valuable evidence would be insulated by the privilege being accorded to 
house counsel . . . .”107  Simon theorized that the “physical proximity of 
house counsel” to corporate employees could make it relatively easy to 
convert counsel from a legal advisor into a “privileged sanctuary for 
corporate records.”108  Simon noted that in such a circumstance, courts 
would most likely force in-house counsel to acquiesce the protections of 
the privilege to prevent a “zone of silence” from insulating ordinary 
corporate business activities from discovery.109 
 
[30] Simon’s views regarding the privilege claims of in-house attorneys 
have proven visionary.  In post-Sealed Case jurisprudence, courts 
applying the clear showing rule have repeatedly recognized that 
companies frequently yield to the temptation to use their internal lawyers 
as a privilege “sanctuary” given their proximity to corporate records.110  
Many of these cases have involved e-mail and have spotlighted how the 
virtual proximity of counsel through a “cc,” “forward,” or “reply” has 
resulted in organizations withholding from discovery communications that 
otherwise lack any indicia of privilege.111  
 
                                                        
107 Id. at 973. 
 
108 Id. 
 
109 See Simon, supra note 22, at 955-56 (“Where corporations are involved, with their 
large number of agents, masses of documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the 
zone of silence grows large.  Few judges—or legislators either, for that matter—would 
long tolerate any common law privilege that allowed corporations to insulate all their 
activities by discussing them with legal advisers.   It is this risk, and this challenge, that 
underlie a number of attorney-client privilege problems peculiar to corporations.”). 
 
110 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 
111 See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
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3.  The United Shoe Rule Followed for the Next Three 
Decades 
 
[31] Despite Simon’s prescient predictions, the holding from United 
Shoe would remain the majority rule on the treatment of in-house 
counsel’s privilege assertions for the next three decades.  During the 1950s 
and 1960s, there was little disagreement as courts and scholarship 
faithfully adhered to the United Shoe rule.112  It was not until the 1970s 
that the winds of change would begin to blow through the judiciary on this 
issue.  During those years, courts and commentators expanded on the 
reasoning from United Shoe and began marking differences between 
outside counsel and in-house lawyers.113  These opinions would eventually 
culminate in the issuance of the clear showing rule by the 1984 Sealed 
Case decision.114 
 
a.  The 1950s and 1960s: The United Shoe Rule at 
Its Zenith 
 
[32] The United Shoe rule was certainly at its zenith during the 1950s 
and the 1960s.115  In the spirit of United Shoe, the cases that examined the 
viability of corporate privilege claims typically gave great deference to in-
house counsel.  Indeed, while acknowledging that communications that 
                                                        
112 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.a. 
 
113 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.b. 
 
114 See discussion infra Part II.C.4. 
 
115 Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (W.D. Mich. 
1966) (citing United Shoe for the proposition that there is little difference between a 
house counsel and an independent counsel. (United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 
89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950)). 
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just involved “business advice” would not be privileged,116 the judiciary 
invariably sided with companies that invoked the privilege on behalf of 
their in-house lawyers.117 
 
[33] For example, in Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States 
Plywood Corp., the court explained that counsel’s status as an in-house 
lawyer was the professional equivalent of the status held by outside 
lawyers.118  As a result, and despite acknowledging that much of counsel’s 
work was “undoubtedly non-legal,” counsel’s discussions were 
nonetheless deemed to be privileged.119  In so doing, the court essentially 
ratified Judge Wyzanski’s dicta that mixed purpose communications 
should ultimately retain their privileged character.120 
 
[34] A similar result occurred in Paper Converting Machine Co. v. 
FMC Corp., which held that several internal company discussions 
involving the defendant’s “corporation patent counsel” were privileged.121  
While certain of those communications appeared to include non-legal 
considerations, the apparent predominance of legal advice tipped the 
scales in favor of the defendant’s privilege claims.122  
                                                         
116 Lowy v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 262 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that 
the privilege did not apply since counsel and the defendant were engaged in a “business 
dealing” and not a legal matter). 
 
117 See, e.g., Ga.-Pac. Plywood Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 465-66 
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
 
118 Id. at 464. 
 
119 Id. at 464-65. 
 
120 Id.; accord United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360. 
 
121 Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1963). 
 
122 Id. at 251–52.   
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[35] Likewise in Natta v. Hogan, the Tenth Circuit reversed a 
production order that would have divulged a privileged message involving 
one of the defendant’s corporate lawyers.123  Relying on United Shoe, the 
Natta court reasoned that the defendant was equally entitled to assert the 
privilege to prevent the discovery of communications involving its house 
lawyers as it would to protect those of its outside counsel.124 
  
[36] The embrace of the United Shoe rule during the 1950s and 1960s is 
perhaps best captured by a 1962 comment from the Yale Law Journal.125  
In that comment, the author cited to United Shoe for the proposition that 
the privilege claims of in-house lawyers should not be defeated due to the 
inclusion of business advice in a particular communication.126  Parroting 
Judge Wyzanski’s reasoning from United Shoe,127 the author noted that 
the privilege applied so long as the communication was arguably focused 
on legal issues.128  To do otherwise might jeopardize the privilege: “If the 
attorney-client privilege is to retain vitality, it must not be withdrawn from 
the attorney who acts in the joint capacity of lawyer and business 
adviser.”129 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
123 Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692–94 (10th Cir. 1968). 
 
124 Id. at 692. 
 
125 Functional Overlap, supra note 59, at 1250. 
 
126 Id. at 1250. 
 
127 Id. at 1250 n.164. 
 
128 Id. at 1250. 
 
129 Id. 
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b.  The 1970s: Transitioning from United Shoe to 
Sealed Case 
 
[37] The majority rule status of the United Shoe doctrine began to 
waver somewhat during the 1970s.  While many judges still followed the 
rule, some commentators and courts began to challenge Judge Wyzanski’s 
dicta regarding mixed purpose communications.  The result of these 
contrary views was a weakening of the protections afforded to corporate 
privilege claims.   During this time of transition, scholarship and court 
decisions implicitly channeled the privilege “sanctuary” and “zone of 
silence” warnings to more carefully scrutinize such claims. 
 
[38] This shifting trend is captured by a 1970 comment in the Harvard 
Law Review.130  In that comment, the author argued that various factors 
justified the application of greater scrutiny to the privilege claims of 
corporate counsel.131  Invoking the privilege “sanctuary” and “zone of 
silence” themes, the author warned that companies could be directing a 
significant amount of non-privileged information through their internal 
lawyers to immunize it from discovery.132  Because much of that 
information focused on “general business purposes” where legal advice 
was not a predominant subject, the author cautioned courts against 
sustaining such privilege assertions.133 
 
[39] The Harvard Law Review comment is significant because it points 
to a shift in attitude regarding the nebulous area where legal and business 
advice are intertwined in the same discussion.  For twenty years, United 
                                                        
130 See The Control Group Test, supra note 60, at 424, 425, n.7, 426. 
 
131 Id. at 427-29. 
 
132 See id. 
 
133 Id. at 428. 
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Shoe and its progeny134 had typically found those messages to be 
privileged so long it was possible find an arguably predominant legal 
purpose in the communication.135  In contrast, the Harvard comment urged 
courts to more carefully scrutinize those communications to ensure that 
legal advice was the primary reason underlying the discussion.136  This 
was precisely the premise that courts used during the 1970s to set the 
groundwork for the clear showing rule. 
 
[40] For example, in United States v. IBM, the court ordered the 
defendant electronics manufacturer to produce various categories of 
communications involving in-house counsel.137  In its effort to stave off 
the production of these records, the manufacturer argued that the privilege 
applied to “all” communications involving its counsel.138  In rejecting that 
sweeping position, the court both clarified and limited the United Shoe 
reasoning that related “non-legal considerations” would not affect 
counsel’s claim of privilege.139  To be privileged, the communication 
could not merely include “incidental legal advice” from house counsel that 
could possibly be called privileged in a subsequent legal proceeding.140  
Instead, the purpose of the communication from the beginning had to be 
primarily focused on legal advice.141  The court opined that a lesser                                                         
134 See supra Part II.C.3.a. 
 
135 Functional Overlap, supra note 59, at 1234-35. 
 
136 The Control Group Test, supra note 60, at 427, 430. 
 
137 United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 213-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 
138 Id. at 212. 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 Id. 
 
141 Id. at 212-13. 
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standard would encourage overreaching and allow for blanket claims over 
non-privileged content.142 
 
[41] The IBM case is significant since it narrows the United Shoe dicta 
regarding mixed purpose communications.  Just as important, it invited 
courts to undertake a more searching inquiry into the privilege claims of 
in-house counsel. 
 
[42] That invitation was accepted by the court in SCM Corp. v. Xerox 
Corp., which overruled the defendant’s privilege objections to certain 
deposition questions regarding a particular licensing strategy.143  The 
defendant’s president had declined to answer the questions since they 
might reveal legal advice that was “interwoven” with related business 
decisions.144  Though legal and non-legal considerations might seem 
inseparable, the court nonetheless ordered the disclosure of the business 
advice.145  This was because the privilege could not be permitted to shield 
business matters from discovery.146  Specifically relying on David 
Simon’s article, the court declared that the privilege was not intended to 
preclude the discovery of relevant, non-legal considerations.147 
 
[43] The IBM and SCM decisions, together with the Harvard comment, 
underscore the greater level of scrutiny that courts were beginning to 
apply to house privilege claims.  Some courts were simply unwilling to 
follow the United Shoe reasoning and blindly accept a privilege assertion 
without further inquiry.  That increasing scrutiny would disproportionately                                                         
142 See Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. at 213. 
 
143 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 517 (D. Conn. 1976). 
 
144 Id. 
 
145 Id. 
 
146 Id. 
 
147 Id. (citing Simon, supra note 22, at 955-56). 
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impact corporate counsel in the next decade and beyond with the issuance 
of Sealed Case and its clear showing rule. 
 
4.  Sealed Case and the Clear Showing Rule 
 
[44] The journey from presumptively privileged under United Shoe to 
today’s trend of heightened scrutiny reached a turning point in 1984 with 
the issuance of Sealed Case.148  In that decision, then-Judge Ginsburg 
established the clear showing rule to ensure that the privilege claims of 
corporate counsel would be properly scrutinized where counsel “had 
certain responsibilities outside the lawyer’s sphere.”149  
 
[45] The rule arose from within the context of a grand jury proceeding 
in which a company’s former “vice president-general counsel” was asked 
certain questions regarding allegations that the company had engaged in 
bid rigging.150  Counsel had declined to answer several questions on the 
ground that they called for the disclosure of privileged discussions.151  The 
district court overruled most of the privilege assertions and ordered 
counsel to respond accordingly.152 
 
[46] On appeal before the D.C. Circuit, the court affirmed some of the 
district court’s rulings.153  In so doing, the court essentially reiterated that 
in-house counsel’s claims were on equal footing as those of retained                                                         
148 In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 
149 Id. at 99. 
 
150 Id. at 96-97. 
 
151 Id. at 97.  
 
152 Id. 
 
153 Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 96. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 
30  
counsel.154  Nevertheless, the court added a critical caveat: “The lawyer 
whose testimony the government seeks in this case served as in-house 
attorney.”155  Since counsel also had non-legal duties as a company vice-
president,  the court required the company to make a clear showing that 
counsel had offered legal advice: “The Company can shelter [counsel’s] 
advice only upon a clear showing that [counsel] gave it in a professional 
legal capacity.”156 
 
[47] With the clear showing rule now articulated, the court proceeded to 
make several rulings on the questions at issue.157  In one particular 
instance, the district court held that the privilege claim did not yield as 
counsel was supposedly “acting as a corporate executive, not as a 
lawyer.”158  The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument, finding instead that 
counsel had advised the company president on the enterprise’s legal 
matters.159 
 
[48] Though the disputed claims of privilege in Sealed Case were not 
exactly monumental, they did provide a vehicle for introducing the clear 
showing rule.  Simply put, the rule requires an organization to establish 
with greater certainty that the advice from its corporate lawyer was made 
in its capacity as a legal counselor, and not as a business advisor.  Such a 
straightforward explanation would not seem to be such a significant 
deviation from the standard established by United Shoe.  However, in the 
jurisprudence that has followed and invoked the Sealed Case decision, it                                                         
154 See id. at 99. 
 
155 Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
 
156 Id. (citing SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus. Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 
157 Id. at 99-103. 
 
158 Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 101. 
 
159 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 
31  
has become apparent that courts are using the clear showing rule to 
conduct a more extensive inquiry of in-house counsel’s privilege claims. 
 
D.  The Proliferation of the Clear Showing Rule and the 
Corresponding Increase in Judicial Scrutiny 
  
[49] In the nearly thirty years since Sealed Case, the clear showing rule 
has permeated the concept of privilege.  This phenomenon—which has 
raised the level of scrutiny on house privilege claims—is evident in both 
commentary and case law from the succeeding decades. In this Section, I 
will discuss some of that commentary.  I will also cite a representative 
sampling of court decisions, which demonstrate the extent to which the 
clear showing rule and its increased level of scrutiny have proliferated 
throughout United States privilege jurisprudence. 
 
1.  Commentary on the Clear Showing Rule 
 
[50] The commentary and scholarship on the clear showing rule evince 
the range and acceptance of this concept as the majority rule regarding in-
house privilege claims.  To be sure, there has been criticism of the rule and 
its resulting impact on corporate counsel.160  For example, in her 1998 
article published by the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Amy Weiss 
criticized the trend of heightened scrutiny caused by the clear showing 
rule.161 In particular, Weiss cited a resolution from the American Bar 
Association (ABA) House of Delegates condemning the trend.162 
According to the ABA, such a trend threatened to relegate in-house 
counsel to “some form of second-tier status” among American lawyers.163                                                         
160 See, e.g., Spahn, supra note 1, at 295-96, 308-10 (criticizing court-appointed special 
master Paul Rice’s approach used in In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 501 F. 
Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007)). 
 
161 See Weiss, supra note 87, at 393-94.  
 
162 Id. at 394. 
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[51] Despite such disapproval, commentators and organizations 
generally agree that the clear showing rule is here to stay. The late Paul 
Rice, who was a leading commentator on the privilege,164 succinctly 
captured what is now the prevailing view in his authoritative treatise: 
 
Many courts fear that businesses will immunize internal 
communications from discovery by placing legal counsel in 
strategic corporate positions and funneling documents through 
counsel . . . . As a result, the courts apply the privilege cautiously, 
and require a clear showing that the attorney was acting in his 
professional legal capacity before cloaking documents in the 
privilege’s protection.165 
 
[52] What is perhaps most instructive from Rice’s discussion on the 
rule is the supporting rationale from the judiciary.  The judicial concerns 
that Rice raised regarding companies using the privilege claims of their 
internal counsel to “immunize” materials from discovery are directly in 
line with the warnings raised in the Yale Law Journal nearly sixty years 
earlier.166 
 
[53] Such views are also squarely in line with those of David 
Greenwald, another privilege commentator.167  Alluding to Simon’s 
warnings, Greenwald acknowledged in his treatise that courts now apply 
heightened scrutiny to house privilege claims to ensure that organizations                                                                                                                                           
163 Id. 
 
164 See Preface to RICE, supra note 51 (Professor Rice apparently compiled “the only 
exhaustive work on the attorney-client privilege in the United States” through 35 years of 
work as a special master for complex litigation, researcher, and professor).  
 
165 Id. at § 7:2 (emphasis added); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 
789, 797 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 
166 See generally Simon, supra note 22. 
 
167 DAVID M. GREENWALD, 1 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:51 (2012). 
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do not “hide mountains of otherwise discoverable information behind a 
veil of secrecy.”168 
 
[54] As those commentators confirm, courts are increasingly vigilant in 
their efforts to penetrate corporate zones of silence and to prevent the use 
of internal counsel as a privilege “sanctuary.”  This development is 
evident in the cases cited in the following Subsection. 
 
2.  Judicial Treatment of the Clear Showing Rule 
 
[55] Courts have generally used the clear showing rule since the 
issuance of Sealed Case to more carefully evaluate the privilege assertions 
of house counsel.  Perhaps best exemplified in the United States v. 
ChevronTexaco Corp. decision,169 many other cases have likewise 
demonstrated the continued efficacy of this doctrine. 
 
[56] For instance, in Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., the court followed Sealed 
Case and held that various communications involving the defendants’ in-
house counsel were not privileged.170  The defendants had argued that the 
discussions at issue were privileged since they touched on various legal 
aspects associated with a corporate restructuring effort.171  Analyzing the 
defendants’ claims through the lens of the clear showing rule, the court                                                         
168 Id.; see also Neuberger Berman Real Estate Income Fund, Inc. v. Lola Brown Trust 
No. 1B, 230 F.R.D. 398, 411, n.20 (D. Md. 2005) (citing the Greenwald treatise and 
acknowledging the trend of heightened scrutiny while applying the general framework 
from United Shoe). 
 
169 United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076-77 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (citing In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 
170 Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418, at *30-33 
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012), modified, No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46274 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 
171 Id. at *13-15. 
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rejected that assertion.172  The court felt constrained to apply greater 
scrutiny given the multiple roles of in-house counsel and the concern that 
the defendants could “conduct their business affairs in private simply by 
staffing a transaction with attorneys.”173  Indeed, it turned out that many of 
the communications focused on the business considerations associated 
with the restructuring effort.174  As a result, the court held that scores of 
those messages were not privileged, despite the inclusion of internal 
counsel.175 
 
[57] Similarly, the court in United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp. 
applied the clear showing rule to certain discussions involving the 
defendant’s in-house counsel.176  Just as in Craig, the ChevronTexaco 
court reasoned that the involvement of house counsel required a more 
probing inquiry into the company’s privilege assertions.177  This inquiry 
culminated in the production of a few messages that were previously 
withheld as privileged.178 
 
[58] Likewise in Argenyi v. Creighton University, the court used the 
clear showing rule to order an in camera inspection of thirty-three 
documents involving the defendant university’s in-house counsel.179  The                                                         
172 See id. at *18, 33-46. 
 
173 Id. at *28 (quoting ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1076). 
 
174 Id. at *12, 27-31. 
 
175 See Craig, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418, at *33-46. 
 
176 See ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. 
 
177 See id. at 1076. 
 
178 See id. at 1078. 
 
179 Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., No. 8:09CV341, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89194, at *13 
(D. Neb. Aug. 10, 2011). 
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documents had been withheld on privilege grounds and a privilege log had 
been produced to substantiate the university’s objections.180  However, in 
light of counsel’s business responsibilities as a company vice president, 
the court gave little credence to the log.181   Applying heightened scrutiny, 
the court found that some of the discussions at issue were non-privileged 
and ordered their production.182 
 
[59] The Craig, ChevronTexaco, and Argenyi cases all relied on the 
specific clear showing language from Sealed Case as the rationale for 
applying greater scrutiny.  These decisions and several others highlight the 
rule’s ubiquitous application in contemporary jurisprudence.183 Indeed, the 
clear showing requirement is often used without being explicitly 
mentioned.184 
 
                                                        
180 See id. *12-14. 
 
181 See id. *14 (citations omitted). 
 
182 See id. at *14-16. 
 
183 See, e.g., Solis v. Milk Specialties Co., 854 F. Supp. 2d 629, 633-34 (E.D. Wis. 2012) 
(holding that certain reports developed by in-house counsel were not privileged since 
they dealt with business matters); Lindley v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 267 F.R.D. 
382, 389 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (applying “heightened” scrutiny to find that many in-house 
privilege claims were not justified); Se. Penn. Transp. Auth. v. CaremarkPCS Health, 
L.P., 254 F.R.D. 253, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (finding particular messages were privileged 
since they were made to secure legal advice, not business advice). 
 
184 See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp., 196 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(observing that the privilege claims of corporate counsel are “questionable in many 
instances” since counsel “may wear several other hats (e.g., business advisor, financial 
consultant)”). 
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[60] These cases also emphasize the disparate level of scrutiny that now 
applies to house privilege claims as opposed to those of outside counsel.185  
The rule from United Shoe regarding the equal status of lawyers’ privilege 
claims is now rarely cited.  Instead, courts take great pains to explain why 
in-house counsel’s claims must be treated differently—and with greater 
scrutiny.  
 
[61] Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Sealed Case progeny is 
the implicit concern about corporate zones of silence.  In light of judicial 
understanding that in-house lawyers frequently render business advice to 
their organizational clients and given the sweeping privilege claims of so 
many enterprises, courts invariably feel compelled to apply heightened 
scrutiny to those claims.186  To do otherwise would be tantamount to 
abdicating the judiciary’s obligation to ensure that privilege assertions are 
both narrowly construed and clearly established by the claimant. 
 
[62] The confluence of issues underlying such concerns has been 
magnified by the role of technology in business operations and in 
litigation.  E-mail has been particularly troublesome in this regard due to 
the sheer volume of messages that include in-house lawyers and which fall 
within the permissible scope of discovery.187  As discussed in Part III, 
however, various other aspects of e-mail are combining to invite unwanted 
transparency and further judicial scrutiny into the privilege assertions of 
in-house counsel.188 
                                                         
185 But see, e.g., Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d, 
Avianca, Inc. v. Harrison, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying the clear showing rule 
to outside counsel’s privilege claims due to his role as business advisor to the client). 
 
186 See Danna, supra note 27, at 1696-97. 
 
187 See Spahn, supra note 1, at 294. 
 
188 See infra Part III.  
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III.  THE PROMISCUOUS USE OF E-MAIL HAS INVITED ADDITIONAL 
SCRUTINY INTO THE PRIVILEGE CLAIMS OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 
 
[63] The scrutiny that courts use to evaluate internal counsel’s privilege 
assertions has become far more acute as digital age technologies have 
grabbed the discovery spotlight.189  While the clear showing rule has 
increased the level of judicial inquiry into in-house privilege claims, that 
trend has been augmented by widespread e-mail use.  Indeed, there is near 
universal agreement on this issue as both courts and cognoscenti agree that 
e-mail is inviting further probing into such claims. 
 
[64] In this Part, I explore the correlation between e-mail and the trend 
of increasing scrutiny.  This includes a discussion of the three key aspects 
of e-mail usage and management that have compelled the courts to more 
carefully examine internal lawyers’ privilege assertions.  These aspects—
the ease of involving counsel on non-privileged e-mails, tactically 
sanitized privilege logs, and overlooked draft e-mails—all serve to 
undermine such assertions. I will also examine the Oracle trilogy of 
opinions and how that case illustrates the quintessential problems that e-
mail has created for these claims. 
 
A.  The Correlation Between E-mail and Heightened Scrutiny 
 
1.  The Ease of Including Counsel on Non-privileged  
E-mails 
 
[65] E-mail has wrought a remarkable change for organizations.190  It 
provides a seamless opportunity for companies to draw in-house counsel 
into various aspects of their operations.191  To be sure, corporate officers                                                         
189 See Danna, supra note 27, at 1695-97.   
 
190 Spahn, supra note 1, at 292-93. 
 
191 See United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, at *9 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 16, 2004) (reasoning that the “rise of e-mail as the primary mode of corporate 
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have often consulted with their legal team on issues outside of traditional 
legal matters.  But the rise of e-mail has expanded this phenomenon 
beyond what was imaginable in previous decades.  Indeed, counsel is 
likely to be included on any conversation that could conceivably have 
legal or business significance for the corporation.192 
 
[66] While this development may be a value-add for many companies, 
it also presents substantial complications for their in-house privilege 
claims.193  The ease of including counsel on any communication through a 
simple “reply,” “cc,” or “forward,” regardless of its content, has raised the 
“zone of silence” specter for the judiciary.194  One commentator framed 
the issue in this fashion: 
 
While it has always been possible for litigants to assert scurrilous 
privilege claims as to non-privileged paper documents addressed 
to counsel, such abusive tactics may have become more pervasive 
with the emergence of electronic technology.  The copying and 
forwarding functions unique to e-mail communications provide an 
effortless means of concealing “smoking guns” by veiling them 
behind a “smoke screen” of privilege.195 
 
                                                                                                                                          
communication permits the broad dissemination and near-complete documentation of 
corporate communications”).  
 
192 Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32 (N.D. 
Ill. June 3, 2002) (explaining that e-mail has replaced many forms of traditional business 
communications such as “informal messages that were previously relayed by telephone 
or at the water cooler”). 
 
193 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liabi. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 
194 See In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 186 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 
195 Danna, supra note 27, at 1700 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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[67] This is particularly significant given the massive amounts of e-mail 
now existing in most corporate electronic information systems.196  Many 
organizations do not wish to incur the expense associated with conducting 
a document-by-document privilege review that may span terabytes of e-
mails.197  While Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and so-called “clawback” 
arrangements may help obviate the costs of additional review personnel or 
the acquisition of more sophisticated electronic review tools,198 they do 
nothing to reverse the increasing scrutiny that courts now use to flesh out 
meritorious claims from those that are frivolous. 
 
[68] As the virtual proximity of counsel and the sheer volume of ESI 
have encouraged unsubstantiated privilege assertions, courts seem more 
inclined than ever to view in-house counsel’s privilege objections with 
increased skepticism.199  For example, in United States v. Segal, the court 
was called on to determine whether the privilege protected ninety-one 
electronic messages from discovery, many of which involved one of the 
defendant’s general counsel.200  Before adjudicating the claims, the court 
observed that two particular factors had added significant complexity to                                                         
196 See Spahn, supra note 1, at 293 (noting that “[w]hile in the past conversations between 
legal and non-legal personnel may have simply been lost to the ether, now there are 
permanent records of nearly every ‘conversation’ conducted through . . . e-mails”). 
 
197 See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005) (explaining the 
costs and conundrums associated with a document-by-document privilege review). 
 
198 FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see also FED. R. EVID. 502 (advisory committee notes) 
(discussing the rule’s framework for addressing the problems associated with the 
inadvertent production of ESI). 
 
199 Danna, supra note 27, at 1700 (explaining that “the temptation to withhold non-
privileged e-mail messages directed to or sent by corporate counsel has grown with the 
overall increase in communications running to or from corporate counsel due to e-mail.”). 
 
200 See United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, *1-*2, *6-
*7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2004). 
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the privilege analysis.201  The first was the “expanded role of corporate 
general counsel” in rendering business advice to the company.202  The 
second was the “rise of e-mail as the primary mode of corporate 
communication . . . .”203  Given these factors, the court applied heightened 
scrutiny to evaluate the defendant’s privilege objections.204  Several of 
those objections were overruled because the messages included general 
counsel for business considerations.205 
 
[69] Likewise, in In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, the 
defendant pharmaceutical company’s use of e-mail with its internal legal 
department invited additional court probing regarding its claims of 
privilege.206  Observing that e-mail had allowed in-house lawyers to be 
conveniently included “on every communication that might be seen as 
having some legal significance at some time,” the court also remarked that 
e-mail enabled house counsel to become involved at a much earlier stage 
in business transactions.207  These factors, along with requests for 
counsel’s advice on “business, technical, scientific, promotional and 
public relations” matters, required the court to more carefully scrutinize 
privilege claims involving the company’s in-house counsel.208   
                                                         
201 Id. at *9. 
 
202 Id. 
 
203 Id. 
 
204 See id. 
 
205 United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, *2, 9-14 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 16, 2004).  
 
206 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 797-98 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 
207 Id. at 798. 
 
208 Id. at 798. 
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[70] Under this framework, many of the company’s privilege objections 
were overruled.209  In particular, the court rejected claims over e-mails 
that were widely distributed to lay employees and that happened to include 
internal lawyers on the recipient list.210 By using such a scattershot 
approach for its distribution strategy, the company essentially conceded 
that the dominant purpose of the e-mails was not focused on obtaining 
legal advice.211  Nor did the content of those messages become privileged 
once a lawyer replied to a particular e-mail.212  Unless those materials 
were produced, the court would provide its imprimatur to the 
impermissible corporate strategy of using counsel to immunize non-
privileged material from discovery.213 
 
[71] The Vioxx decision highlights the pervasive problem with 
corporate privilege claims in the era of e-mail messaging, i.e., the 
inclusion of in-house counsel on non-privileged communications.214  
Whether inadvertently or intentionally, the over-inclusion of counsel in e-
mails through a “cc,” “reply,” or “forward” invites further judicial 
examination of such privilege claims. 
 
[72] Another instance of this phenomenon is found in In re Gabapentin 
Patent Litigation, where the District Court for the District of New Jersey 
ordered the production of several e-mails previously withheld as 
privileged given the perfunctory inclusion of counsel on “routine                                                         
209 See id. at 804-05 
 
210 See id. at 805-06. 
 
211 See Vioxx, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 805-06.   
 
212 See id. at 806. 
 
213 See id. at 797 (quoting RICE, supra note 51, at § 7:2, at 34-35). 
 
214 See id. at 798 (citing RICE, supra note 51, § 7:3, at 59-61).  
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business” communications.215  Taking issue with the plaintiffs’ 
indiscriminate use of the privilege, the court characterized the following 
situational e-mails as non-privileged: “Including an attorney on the 
distribution list of an interoffice memo, Cc’ing numerous people who are 
ancillary to the discussion, one of whom happens to be an attorney, or 
forwarding an e-mail several times until it reaches an attorney.”216 
 
[73] Similarly, in Fru-Con Construction Corp. v. Sacramento 
Municipal Utility District, the court condemned the defendant utility 
district’s efforts to prevent the discovery of non-privileged e-mails 
involving its in-house counsel.217  Holding that such communications were 
subject to discovery, the court criticized the district for asserting that the e-
mails were protected even though counsel was copied for ancillary 
reasons.218  While such e-mails might be “embarrassing” to the district, 
that reason could not possibly justify a claim of privilege.219 
 
[74] These cases and many others exemplify how e-mail has enabled 
organizations to turn the virtual proximity of in-house counsel into an 
impermissible privilege “sanctuary” for non-privileged ESI.  Such conduct 
has given rise to another troubling aspect of e-mail that has invited 
additional court scrutiny—strategically sanitized privilege logs.220                                                         
215 In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 186-87 (D.N.J. 2003).  
 
216 Id. at 186.  
 
217 See Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., Civ. No. S-05-0583 LKK 
GGH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59066, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2006). 
 
218 See id. 
 
219 See id. at *15. 
 
220 See, e.g., United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-
1002-Orl-31TBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012); 
B.F.G. of Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99 C 4604, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930, at 
*15 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001);  
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2.  Strategically Sanitized Privilege Logs 
 
[75] The bitter fruit of internal counsel’s inclusion on non-privileged e-
mails is the heightened judicial inquiry into the adequacy of parties’ 
privilege logs.221  Designed to satisfy the procedural requirement that a 
privilege objection be stated with particularity, privilege logs have in 
practice been converted into a costly game in which litigants disclose as 
little as possible about the communications they have withheld as 
privileged.222 Such a strategy is understandable given a claimant’s 
reluctance to reveal privileged content.223  Nevertheless, this tactic often 
backfires since courts now frequently review privileged materials to 
substantiate the claims.224  Moreover, because organizations tend to make 
blanket privilege assertions over masses of e-mails involving house 
counsel, courts generally expect to find non-privileged content.225 The 
                                                        
221 See, e.g., Baklid-Kunz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, at *14-15 (holding that several 
e-mails identified in the privilege log involving internal counsel were not privileged). 
 
222 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(5)(A)(ii).  Rule 26(b)(5)(A) requires parties to “describe the 
nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—
and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, 
will enable other parties to assess the claim.”  Id.  The failure to serve a timely and 
adequate privilege log could result in a waiver of the privilege’s protection.  See  
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 
F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that a tardy and inadequate privilege log 
resulted in a privilege waiver); Kevin Brady, Top 10 Things You Never Hear on Privilege 
Logs, ESPECTABLE.COM (Jan. 10, 2013), http://espectable.com/942/. 
 
223 See Brady, supra note 222.   
 
224 See Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege “Cautiously and Narrowly” Applied to In-
House Counsel, PRESNELL ON PRIVILEGES (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://presnellonprivileges.com/2013/01/10/corporate-attorney-client-privilege-
cautiously-and-narrowly-applied-to-in-house-counsel/. 
 
225 See Ameritech, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930, at *15. 
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case of B.F.G. of Illinois, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp. is particularly instructive 
on this issue.226 
 
[76] In Ameritech, the court ordered the defendants to produce hundreds 
of e-mails previously withheld as privileged, many of which involved in-
house counsel.227  In their privilege log, the defendants buried the non-
privileged content from those e-mails behind whitewashed descriptions.228  
Suspicious that in-house counsel was apparently deployed on business and 
not purely legal matters, the court elected to use heightened scrutiny to 
ensure that the claims involving counsel were proper.229  The court’s more 
probing examination revealed that the defendants used in-house counsel 
“to give a veneer of privilege to otherwise non-privileged business 
communications.”230  This was particularly frustrating to the court, which 
observed that the privilege log, as drafted, obstructed any effort to verify 
the claims short of an in camera inspection.231 
 
[77] As the Ameritech case teaches, the twin abuses of overreaching 
privilege claims and deceptive privilege logs can only be detected through 
heightened scrutiny.232  Such discovery misconduct has also triggered the 
onerous requirement that individual e-mails be separately identified in a                                                         
226 See generally id. 
 
227 See id. at *13.  
 
228 Id. at *16-17. 
 
229 See id. at *15 (reasoning that where in-house counsel is deployed on business instead 
of legal matters, the organization claiming the privilege must satisfy “a particular burden 
. . . to demonstrate why communications [involving counsel] deserve protection and are 
not merely business documents.”). 
 
230 Ameritech, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930, at * 15 (citation omitted). 
 
231 See id. at *19. 
 
232 See id. at *16, *19. 
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privilege log.233  The United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax 
Hospital Medical Center case reflects this troubling trend.234 
 
[78] In Baklid-Kunz, the court overruled several privilege objections in 
connection with e-mails that included the defendants’ internal lawyers.235  
The e-mails in question did not involve legal advice, but instead simply 
“copied” counsel or kept them “in the loop” on various business issues.236  
To ensure that all such e-mails were properly scrutinized and thereby 
prevent further “funneling of non-privileged information” through 
counsel, the court held that the defendants’ privilege log was required to 
identify each message in an e-mail string.237  Even though digital age 
technology had allowed all messages in the string to be grouped together,                                                         
233 See, e.g., NLRB v. Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d 492, 503 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that e-mails generally should be separately identified in a privilege log); Hillsdale Envtl. 
Loss Prev. Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, Civil Action 10-2008-CM-DJW, 
10-2068-CM-DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *18 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011) 
(holding that requirement that each e-mail be separately identified was necessary to 
address a defendant’s “stealth” privilege claims regarding non-privileged e-mails 
involving its in-house counsel). 
 
234 United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002-Orl-
31TBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012).  While the majority 
rule requires litigants to separately list each message from an e-mail string in a privilege 
log, there are cases that have only required parties to identify only the “last-in-time” e-
mail.  See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 510, 517, 
n.9 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining that the court would only consider “the most recently 
sent e-mail” in a string claimed as privileged); Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials 
Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 238, 240-41 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that e-mails between lay 
employees that are later directed to in-house counsel and which seek legal advice need 
not be listed in a privilege log since the log’s description might disclose the nature of the 
privileged consultation). 
 
235 Baklid-Kunz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, at *33. 
 
236 Id. 
 
237 Id. at *9, *14. 
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the court ordered the messages to be individually listed to provide the 
challenging party with an opportunity to better evaluate the merits of the 
claim.238  
 
[79] In similar fashion, the court in In re Universal Service Fund 
Telephone Billing Practices Litigation required that individual e-mails be 
separately identified in a privilege log.239  The defendant 
telecommunications provider had argued that it should be permitted to 
group messages from an e-mail string under a single entry.240  In rejecting 
that argument, the court cited concerns over “stealth” privilege assertions 
that “could never be the subject of a meaningful challenge by opposing 
counsel or actual scrutiny by a judge.”241  Despite the additional costs and 
burdens that such a rule would undoubtedly impose on the defendant, it 
was deemed necessary to counteract abuses with privilege claims.242  
Applying that rule to the provider’s objections, the court eventually held 
that numerous e-mails involving house counsel were not privileged.243 
 
[80] The Ameritech, Baklid-Kunz, and Universal Service Fund cases 
and other decisions244 amply demonstrate how organizations’ privilege log                                                         
238 Id. at *14-16.  
 
239 In re Unv’l Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 232 F.R.D. 669, 672, 674 (D. Kan. 
2005). 
 
240 Id. at 672. 
 
241 Id. at 673. 
 
242 Id. at 674. 
 
243 See id. at 674, 677-80; accord NLRB v. Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d 492, 503 (4th 
Cir. 2011). 
 
244 See generally Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16418 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012), modified, No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
46274 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012); Acosta v. Target Corp., 281 F.R.D. 314 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
(criticizing the defendant’s tactics surrounding its privilege log and imposing costs and 
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practices with respect to e-mail have increased the scrutiny that courts 
now apply to in-house privilege claims.245  Such privilege log tactics and 
the claims they are designed to protect are also being exposed by 
undetected draft e-mails.   
 
3.  Overlooked Draft E-mails 
[81] A third and final complicating factor involving e-mail is the 
existence of electronically generated drafts.246  Draft e-mails are a 
particularly tricky proposition since there is generally no historical 
analogue for this form of ESI.247  While paper drafts of contracts or other 
documents may have been retained in some instances, corporate records                                                                                                                                           
related penalties as a punishment for doing so); Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Fresenius 
Med. Care Holding, Inc., No. C 07-1359 PJH (JL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85180 (N.D. 
Ca. Oct. 10, 2008) (following majority rule and ordering the defendants to separately 
identify each message contained in an e-mail string); St. Andrews Park, Inc. v. United 
States Dept. of the Army Corps of Eng’rs, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(holding that the defendant’s grouping of e-mails in its privilege log ran afoul of the rule 
that each e-mail should be separately identified). 
 
245 The consequences of such scrutiny are not limited to privilege arena.  The collateral 
impact includes a dramatic rise in attorney fees relating to privilege log litigation.  See 
Unv’l Serv. Fund, 232 F.R.D. at 674 (lamenting the expense associated with the 
preparation of a privilege log which requires litigants to separately identify each message 
from an e-mail string).  There are efforts being made to reverse this trend, though it is 
unclear whether they will ultimately be successful given the factors identified in this 
Subsection.  See John M. Facciola & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Asserting and Challenging 
Privilege Claims in Modern Litigation: The Facciola-Redgrave Framework, 4 FED. CTS. 
L. REV. 19, 49 (2009) (arguing that in certain instances parties should be required to log 
only the so-called “last-in-time” message in an e-mail string). 
 
246 See Oracle II, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *5-6 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 20, 2011) (explaining that Gmail accounts by default auto-save drafts every few 
minutes). 
 
247 See generally Charles A. Lovell & Roger W. Holmes, The Dangers of E-mail: The 
Need for Electronic Data Retention Policies, 44- R.I. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 7, 8 (discussing 
the relative ease of recovering deleted and prior drafts of e-mails through discovery). 
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management policies generally did not require the retention of paper drafts 
of internally circulated memoranda.248  Even in those few instances where 
a paper draft may have been kept, it is doubtful that every draft of the 
memo was retained by the organization or its internal legal team.249  As 
one commentator observed, “it is unlikely that a party would print out and 
retain every preliminary draft of a document.”250 
 
[82] That last point illustrates a striking difference between paper 
documents and ESI.251  Unlike paper, many e-mail systems have 
functionality that provides for the creation and retention of drafts while the 
e-mail is being prepared.252  If an organization has designed its electronic 
information systems to retain those draft e-mails, they may become a 
particularly important source of information in discovery.253  Martin 
Redish, an expert in federal civil procedure, highlighted the significance of 
draft ESI for discovery purposes in the Duke Law Journal in 2001.254  As 
Redish explained, draft ESI can provide clarity on certain issues since it                                                         
248 See id. 
 
249 See Corrinne L. Giacobbe, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding 
Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 257, 260-61 (2000). 
 
250 Id. at 261. 
 
251 See id. at 260 (explaining that “litigants who fail to request electronic data will never 
find many files through traditional means of paper discovery”).   
 
252 See, e.g., Byers v. Ill. St. Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32 
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002) (observing that “computers have the ability to capture several 
copies (or drafts) of the same e-mail, thus multiplying the volume of documents.  All of 
these e-mails must be scanned for both relevance and privilege.”). 
 
253 See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 
561, 587-88 (2001). 
 
254 See generally id.  
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may reveal insights into corporate decision-making before being sanitized 
“for political correctness and legal considerations.”255  As the Oracle 
litigation makes clear, those same observations regarding ESI are equally 
applicable to e-mail.256 
 
[83] Given their potential importance in litigation, e-mail drafts can 
become a conundrum for companies, particularly with respect to their in-
house privilege claims.257  If a company cannot match up those drafts with 
the “sent” version involving house counsel that it has claimed as 
privileged, the drafts may be produced in discovery.258  This could expose 
the withheld e-mail to additional scrutiny, particularly if the drafts impugn 
the credibility of the privilege claim.259  Such a scenario is beyond a 
hypothetical, as demonstrated in the Oracle privilege dispute. 
 
B.  Oracle America v. Google—The Quintessential Example of 
How E-mail Has Increased Judicial Scrutiny 
 
[84] While the above referenced cases illustrate how e-mail has 
introduced additional, unwanted transparency into the privilege claims of 
corporate counsel, none of these decisions captures the issues quite like 
the Oracle litigation.  The Oracle case spotlights how the three troubling 
aspects of e-mail analyzed in this Part all served to invite heightened                                                         
255 Id.; accord Giacobbe, supra note 249, at 261 (explaining the potential significance of 
draft ESI in litigation). 
 
256 Oracle III, 462 F. App’x. 975, 976-78 (Fed. Circ. 2012); Oracle II, No. C 10-03561 
WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011); Oracle I, No. 
C 10-03561 WHA DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *6-11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 
2011). 
 
257 See Oracle III, 462 F. App’x at 976-78. 
 
258 See, e.g., Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *5-10, 12. 
 
259 See, e.g., id. at *2, *9.  
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scrutiny into Google’s claim of privilege over a critical e-mail sent to one 
of its internal lawyers. 
 
1.  The Lawsuit 
 
[85] The litigation involving technology titans Oracle America 
(“Oracle”)260 and Google involved claims of copyright and patent 
infringement with respect to features of Java and Android.261  In 
particular, Oracle alleged that Google had misappropriated its Java 
technology to bolster its widely popular Android operating system.262  As 
part of the effort to establish its claims, Oracle presented in court a draft 
that Google produced in discovery of the privileged e-mail.263  Shortly 
thereafter, Google notified Oracle that the draft was also privileged and 
demanded its return, along with all of the other drafts of the e-mail that 
were mistakenly produced.264  Oracle disputed the privilege claim, arguing 
instead that the e-mail was not privileged and went to the heart of its 
infringement allegations.265 
 
 
                                                         
260 Oracle America, which is owned by Oracle Corporation, is a successor-in-interest to 
Sun Microsystems, Inc.  Company Overview of Oracle America, Inc., BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=34903 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 
261 Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *7. 
 
262 See id. 
 
263 See d. at *8. 
 
264 See id. 
 
265 See Oracle I, No. C 10-03561 WHA DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 26, 2011). 
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2.  The Disputed E-mail 
 
[86] The e-mail at issue originated from Tim Lindholm, a Google 
software engineer.266  It was prepared shortly before Oracle filed its 
infringement lawsuit and while the parties were engaging in negotiations 
to stave off litigation.267  Lindholm sent the message to a Andy Rubin, a 
Google Vice President in charge of Android, as well as Ben Lee, a Google 
Senior Counsel, and included another Google engineer, Dan Grove, in the 
“cc” field.268  In the message’s salutation, Lindholm specifically directed 
the e-mail only to Rubin.269  Lindholm explained that he and Grove had 
been asked by Google founders Larry Page and Sergei Brin to “investigate 
what technical alternatives exist to Java for Android and Chrome.”270  The 
investigation had proven unsuccessful, with Lindholm ultimately 
concluding that the alternatives to Java “all suck.”271  Lindholm suggested 
that Google should “negotiate a license for Java under the terms we 
need.”272 
 
[87] Before the e-mail was sent to its recipients, Google’s internal e-
mail system saved nine drafts of the message.273  Those drafts were                                                         
266 The e-mail is reproduced verbatim in Oracle II and in Oracle III.  Oracle III, 462 F. 
App’x. 975, 976 (Fed. Circ. 2012); Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *7-8. 
 
267 See Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *5-8. 
 
268 See Oracle III, 462 F. App’x. at 976. 
 
269 See id. 
 
270 Id. 
 
271 Id. 
 
272 Id. 
 
273 See Oracle II, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 20, 2011). 
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sequentially created, showing the gradual development of the message.274  
It was not until the final draft that Lindholm included the headings 
“Attorney Work Product” and “Google Confidential.”275  Moreover, the 
names of the e-mail recipients were not found in any of the saved drafts.276   
 
[88] In discovery, Google withheld the disputed e-mail, along with the 
ninth and final draft, on privilege grounds.277  Google represented in its 
privilege log that the e-mail and corresponding draft reflected a privileged 
communication with its in-house counsel, Lee.278 Google nonetheless 
produced the other eight drafts of the e-mail since its “electronic scanning 
mechanisms” did not flag the drafts before they were disclosed.279  This 
apparently happened because the draft messages “did not contain . . . 
confidentiality or privilege headings . . . [or] any addressees.”280 
 
3.  The Magistrate’s Production Order 
 
[89] Motion practice surrounding the disputed e-mail took place first 
before U.S. Magistrate Judge, Donna Ryu.281  In contesting Oracle’s 
production request, Google argued that Lindholm was conducting the 
research referenced in the disputed e-mail at the direction of Google’s                                                         
274 See id. at *6. 
 
275 See id. 
 
276 See id. 
 
277 Id. at 9. 
 
278 See Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *8. 
 
279  Id. 
 
280 Id. 
 
281 Oracle I, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 26, 2011). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 
53  
general counsel as well as Lee.282  According to Google, since the research 
was designed to help Google’s counsel render legal advice on the pending 
lawsuit, the e-mail was privileged.283  That position, argued Google, was 
further confirmed by Lindholm’s insertion of the “Attorney Work 
Product” and “Google Confidential” designations.284 
 
[90] Judge Ryu rejected these assertions, ruling instead that Google had 
failed to meet the test of heightened scrutiny.285  Judge Ryu explained that 
Google had to make a clear showing that the presence of Lee on the e-mail 
was for the purpose of providing legal advice to the company.286  The 
judge reasoned that such a showing was critical since “[i]n-house counsel 
may act as integral players in a company’s business decisions or activities 
. . . .”287 
 
[91] Using the clear showing rule as a touchstone, Judge Ryu reasoned 
that the plain language of the e-mail contradicted Google’s after-the-fact 
explanations.288  While Lee was included in the “To” portion of the e-
mail, the salutation was directed to Rubin, a lay company executive.289  
The e-mail also conflicted with Google’s assertion that Lindholm had                                                         
282 See id. at *6-8. 
 
283 See id. 
 
284 See id. *7. 
 
285 See id. at *17-18. 
 
286 Oracle I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *18 (citing United States v. 
ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). 
 
287 Id. at *17. 
 
288 See id. at *14-16. 
 
289 Id. at *7. 
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performed the referenced research at the direction of legal counsel.290  
Instead, Lindholm unequivocally explained in the message that his 
research was performed at the direction of Google’s lay founders, Brin and 
Page.291  Moreover, Lindholm’s reference that his research was related to 
Chrome—a Google product not implicated by Oracle’s lawsuit—belied 
Google’s representation that the research was focused on the pending 
litigation.292  Finally, merely labeling a document as “Work Product” 
could not satisfy the standard of heightened scrutiny required for such a 
communication.293  Since Google had failed to meet the clear showing 
requirement, the court stripped the disputed e-mail of its privilege 
designation and ordered its immediate production to Oracle.294 
 
4.  The District Court’s Order Denying Google’s 
Objections to the Magistrate’s Order 
 
[92] Dissatisfied with Judge Ryu’s ruling, Google filed various 
objections to the production order and brought the matter before U.S. 
District Judge William Alsup.  At the heart of Google’s objections was its 
contention that the magistrate had used the wrong legal standard by 
applying Sealed Case’s heightened scrutiny test to the disputed e-mail.295  
Judge Alsup declined to adopt that position, observing that such scrutiny 
was necessary to counteract the common corporate practice of including 
in-house counsel on “business communications as an attempt to cloak a                                                         
290 See id. at *14-16.  
 
291 Oracle I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *7, 13. 
 
292  Id. at *14. 
 
293 Id. *14-16. 
 
294 See id. at *20. 
 
295 Oracle II, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *23 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 20, 2011) (citing In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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business message in privilege.”296  Finding that the magistrate’s use of 
heightened scrutiny was proper, the court overruled Google’s other related 
objections to the magistrate’s order.297 
 
5.  The Federal Circuit’s Denial of Google’s Mandamus 
Petition 
 
[93] Google’s final effort to prevent disclosure of the disputed e-mail 
came before the Federal Circuit. In its mandamus petition, Google again 
challenged the application of the clear showing rule, but this time with a 
twist on its prior argument.  Unlike the objection it filed with the district 
court, Google conceded the propriety of the rule.298  Nevertheless, Google 
argued that the rule was limited to those instances where internal counsel 
was also tasked with business responsibilities.299  Since there was no 
evidence that Lee had any duties outside of his legal work, Google argued 
that there was no basis for using the rule.300  Indeed, Google characterized 
the magistrate’s holding as a “radically broadened version” of the clear 
showing doctrine.301 
 
[94] The Federal Circuit found this position to lack merit. Sidestepping 
the distinction Google raised regarding house counsel’s duties, the court 
opined that Google was still required to show that the e-mail’s primary 
purpose was to obtain legal advice.302  Irrespective of Lee’s duties as                                                         
296 Id. at *23-24 n.4. 
 
297 See id. at *23, 30. 
 
298 Oracle III, 462 F. App’x. 975, 977-78 (Fed. Circ. 2012). 
 
299 See id. at 978. 
 
300 See id. 
 
301 Id. 
 
302 See id. 
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counsel, communications such as the Lindholm e-mail that were focused 
on business strategy and not legal advice could not be protected as 
privileged.303  The court accordingly denied Google’s mandamus petition. 
 
6.  The Legacy of Oracle on E-mail Privilege Claims 
Involving House Counsel 
 
[95] The Oracle case amply demonstrates the troubles that e-mail has 
caused for the privilege assertions of in-house lawyers. Indeed, the three 
aspects of e-mail that are inviting further court scrutiny into such claims 
were central issues in that case. With the virtual proximity that e-mail has 
introduced into internal corporate communications, it was easy for Lee to 
be included on a business related e-mail. Given Lee’s inclusion on the e-
mail and the sensitive tenor of Lindholm’s conclusions, it was strategically 
sensible for Google to withhold the document as privileged. While 
Google’s privilege log predictably gave no indication that the e-mail was 
focused on business matters, the drafts it mistakenly produced belied its 
privilege objection. These factors invited the court to probe more deeply 
into the content of the communication to ensure that it met the clear 
showing rule. Were any of these elements lacking from the equation, a 
different result may very well have occurred. 
 
[96] The legacy of Oracle for in-house privilege claims is indeed 
problematic.  While the Federal Circuit may have circumvented Google’s 
argument on the clear showing rule, it does not change the fact that 
Google was correct in noting that the Sealed Case doctrine has been 
expanded beyond its original intent.  While the clear showing rule was 
originally designed to ensure that claims asserted by counsel with legal 
and business roles were more carefully reviewed, most courts now assume 
that corporate lawyers are rendering business advice.304  Nevertheless, that 
assumption seems justified given the realities of today’s corporate                                                         
303 See Oracle III, 462 F. App’x at 978. 
 
304 See, e.g., id.  
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workplace and the increasing transparency that e-mail provides into 
counsel’s communications.  The confluence of these factors suggests that 
companies will find it more difficult in the future to make defensible 
claims of privilege. 
 
[97] The clear lesson from Oracle is that companies must implement 
better practices with respect to their employees’ promiscuous use of e-mail 
as well as their privilege reviews in discovery.  Until they do, 
organizations can expect to find more probing by judicial officers who 
treat their privilege assertions with understandable cynicism.  Moreover, 
such skeptical scrutiny figures to expand beyond the realm of e-mail as in-
house lawyers and their corporate colleagues use newer, more promising, 
and yet more disruptive technologies to conduct internal communications 
and business strategy. 
 
 
 
IV.  THE IMPACT OF PROMISING YET DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND 
TRENDS ON IN-HOUSE PRIVILEGE CLAIMS 
 
[98] The concerns surrounding the impact of technology on the 
privilege claims of in-house lawyers are not limited to just e-mail.  As 
other digital age advances revolutionize the ways in which companies 
conduct their business operations, they also have the potential to 
negatively impact these claims.  Such advances include social networking 
sites, cloud computing, and BYOD policies.  While these innovations can 
facilitate effective and efficient commercial enterprise, they could also 
jeopardize the sacrosanct element of confidentiality required for privileged 
communications. 
 
[99] In this Part, I discuss how these innovations are providing 
unwanted transparency into the otherwise privileged communications of 
in-house lawyers.  This includes an analysis of how such advances enable 
third party access to those communications, which might compromise the 
perception of confidentiality between counsel and the organizational 
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client.  I also address how courts would likely evaluate the merits of such 
claims given the absence of controlling legal authority on these issues and 
in light of heightened scrutiny. 
 
A.  Communications Made through Social Networking Sites 
May Not Be Privileged 
 
[100] Social networking sites represent a burgeoning communications 
frontier.305  While extremely popular among individual consumers,306 
social media is also widely accepted and increasingly used in most 
industry verticals.307  The legal profession is no exception to this growing 
trend.308  An increasing number of lawyers are using social networks for                                                         
305 See Allison Walton, Social Media and eDiscovery: New Kid on the Block, but the 
Same Story, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-
discovery-blog/2011/09/30/social-media-and-ediscovery-new-kid-on-the-block-but-the-
same-story/ (describing social media as the “new e-mail” and discussing related 
discovery challenges). 
 
306 See Social Networking Popular Across Globe, PEW RESEARCH (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/12/12/social-networking-popular-across-globe/ (“In 
countries such as Britain, the United States, Russia, the Czech Republic and Spain, about 
half of all adults now use Facebook and similar websites.”). 
 
307 See Peter J. Pizzi, Where Cyber and Employment Law Intersect, Risks for 
Management Abound, ASPATORE, July 2011, at *1, available at 2011 WL 3020563 (“By 
2014, some say that social media will replace upwards of 20 percent of the use of 
workplace e-mail.”); see NIELSEN, STATE OF THE MEDIA: THE SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT 
2012 1, 2 ( 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-
downloads/2012-Reports/The-Social-Media-Report-2012.pdf (The prevalence of 
personal use of social networking sites has arguably fueled its popularity in the business 
world.). 
 
308 See Matt Silverman, How Lawyers Are Using Social Media for Real Results, 
MASHABLE (June 1, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/06/01/lawyers-social-media/ 
(“[I]n-house attorneys now are using new media platforms to deepen their professional 
networks; to obtain their legal, business, and industry news and information; and to 
enrich their social and personal lives.  Most importantly, they expect that trend to 
accelerate in the future."). 
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various professional reasons.309  While research and marketing are far and 
away the most common uses, lawyers are also communicating with clients 
regarding legal issues.310  This includes in-house attorneys, who 
correspond with lay employees over social networks about internal 
corporate matters.311 
 
[101] While social networks may offer in-house lawyers a convenient 
and comfortable medium to discuss internal company issues, they could 
present insurmountable challenges for preserving the privileged character 
of those discussions. This is due in substantial part to the terms of service 
that govern the use of those sites. In this Subsection, I highlight common 
terms of service that provide social networks with access to user content. 
These access rights often include content from so-called private messages 
sent through a network’s direct messaging functionality. I also examine 
how courts would interpret user agreements under existing case authority 
and through the lens of heightened scrutiny to construe corporate lawyers’ 
privilege assertions. 
                                                         
309 Stephanie Francis Ward, Lawyers Using Social Media More, Says ABA Tech Survey, 
A.B.A. J. (Aug. 16, 2010, 1:57 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_using_social_media_more_says_aba_te
ch_survey/ (noting that eleven percent of lawyers surveyed use social media for 
“professional reasons, which is up from [six percent] in 2011.”). 
 
310 See Wendy L. Patrick, “Proceed With Caution” Navigating The Latest Ethical Rules, 
TSTJ08 ALI-ABA 27, 45 (2012) (“[M]any lawyers are actively using these [social 
networking] sites to share information about their professional lives and showcase their 
accomplishments.”); Meghan Ennes, Social Media: What Most Companies Don’t Know, 
HAR. BUS. REV., http://hbr.org/web/slideshows/social-media-what-most-companies-dont-
know/1-slide (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (showing that in 69% of organizations, the 
marketing department is responsible for development of social media strategy). 
 
311 See Social Media, supra note 38, at 12 (“[Seventy] percent of in[-]house lawyers 
between the ages of [thirty] and [thirty-nine] had used Facebook for personal reasons in 
the previous [twenty-four] hours and that [fifty] percent had used it for professional 
reasons in the previous week.”).   
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1.  Social Networks’ Messaging Features May Lack the 
Confidentiality to Remain Privileged 
 
a.  Common Site Features 
 
[102] Social networks provide their users with any number of offerings 
to communicate and share content with others. The two most common 
features among site offerings are the open forum setting and direct 
messaging functionality. 
 
[103] The open forum setting typically allows both the user and those 
within the user’s selected community to exchange messages, pictures, 
documents, hyperlinks, and other information. Analogous to the traditional 
cork-and-pin bulletin board concept, an electronic open forum is designed 
to enable widespread circulation of user content. This is certainly the case 
with leading social networking sites Twitter,312 Facebook,313 MySpace,314 
LinkedIn,315 and reddit.316 All of these sites provide users with an open 
ecosystem that permits broad distribution of user materials. 
 
[104] For example, Twitter allows users to post a pithy message (or 
tweet) of no more than 140 characters to their respective communities.317                                                         
312 See About, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 
313 See About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last visited Nov. 1, 
2013).  
 
314 See Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, 
https://www.myspace.com/pages/terms (last updated June 10, 2013).  
 
315 See About LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Nov. 1, 
2013).  
 
316 See About reddit, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/about (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 
317 See About, supra note 312. 
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The tweet may contain text as well as “photos, videos, and links to other 
websites.”318  However, as expressly set forth in the “Twitter Privacy 
Policy,” tweets are generally “public by default” and “may be viewed all 
around the world instantly.”319  Similarly, LinkedIn, Facebook, and 
MySpace users can respectively share “updates,”320 write on a user’s 
“wall,”321 and create a “profile comment,”322 all of which can then be 
viewed instantaneously by members of the user’s group.323  Reddit324 and 
other social networking sites325 have similar functionality.                                                         
318 Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Nov. 1, 
2013).  
 
319 Id.  
 
320  Sharing Ideas, Questions, Articles and Website Links, LINKEDIN, 
http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/434 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“You 
can share thoughts, articles or other content-rich websites with others from several places. 
This is sometimes known as posting an update or sharing an update.”) 
 
321 Wall Definition, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/266010756746812/?q=wall&sid=06199PxbSjxjs2yZp 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“Your Wall is the space on your timeline where you and 
friends can post and share.”). 
 
322  How to Post a MySpace Profile Comment, FOR DUMMIES, 
http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-to-post-a-myspace-profile-comment.html 
(last visited July 30, 2013) (“Posting a Profile Comment on MySpace is an easy and 
effective way to communicate with the members of your Friend List.”). 
 
323 In many instances, other users beyond a member’s direct group may view and remark 
content.   See Kashmir Hill, The Facebook Privacy Setting that Tripped Up Randi 
Zuckerberg, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/12/26/the-facebook-privacy-setting-that-
tripped-up-randi-zuckerberg/ (describing how Randi Zuckerberg, sister of Facebook 
founder Mark Zuckerberg, inadvertently shared a private photo beyond her direct group).  
See also Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN § 2(6), http:// http://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-
policy (last visited July 31, 2013) (“Content distributed through LinkedIn’s sharing 
features . . . may result in displaying some of your personal information outside of 
LinkedIn.”).  
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[105] In contrast, the direct messaging features that some sites furnish to 
their users are designed for one-on-one interaction.  Instead of publicly 
displaying exchanged content to the entire community, direct messages are 
received by specified addressees in a virtual inbox.  Referred to as “chats” 
by reddit,326 “direct messages” by Twitter,327 “private messages” by 
MySpace,328 and “messages” by LinkedIn329 and Facebook,330 such 
discussions may be opened only by the identified recipients.  Because 
other members of the user’s community are not privy to direct messages, 
                                                                                                                                          
324 What Is reddit?, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/faq (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) 
(“reddit is a source for what’s new and popular on the web. Users like you provide all of 
the content and decide, through voting, what’s good and what’s junk.”). 
 
325 See, e.g., Share and Discover, All Across Google, GOOGLE+, 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/+/learnmore/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); What Is 
Pinterest?, PINTEREST, http://about.pinterest.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); About 
Flickr, FLICKR, https://secure.flickr.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 
326 See User Agreement, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/useragreement (last updated 
April 10, 2012). 
 
327 See Posting or Deleting Direct Messages, TWITTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/14606-posting-or-deleting-direct-messages (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 
328 See Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314. 
 
329 See Sending Messages to Connections and Contacts, LINKEDIN, 
http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1645 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 
330 See The New Messages, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/messages/ (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
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those communications have been compared to e-mail331 and characterized 
as “inherently private.”332 
 
b.  Terms of Service Enable Site Employee 
Access to User Communications 
 
[106] Regardless of their range of distribution, messages exchanged on 
social networks may be accessed and monitored by site employees under 
the governing terms of service.  While those terms typically provide 
privacy settings that allow users to limit the extent to which information 
may be disseminated, they also notify users about site employee access to 
their communications.  The justification for such access varies from site to 
site, with the terms of service delineating the lack of confidentiality 
associated with user communications, including direct messages. 
 
[107] For example, reddit admonishes users that it monitors all forms of 
user “activity” to ensure compliance with its policies.333  This includes 
open forum conduct and supposedly private “chats” between users, as 
reddit states that “we may monitor activity on the Website, including in 
the bulletin boards, forums, personal ads, and chats . . . .”334  Twitter and 
MySpace are not much different, with each site reserving the right to 
“access, read, preserve, and disclose any information” that a user discloses 
                                                        
331 See Ryan A. Ward, Discovering Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the Stored 
Communications Act, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 563, 572 (2011). 
 
332  Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(holding that messages sent through the direct messaging features provided by Facebook 
and MySpace are “inherently private”). 
 
333 User Agreement, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/useragreement (last updated 
Apr. 10, 2012). 
 
334 Id. 
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on the site.335  In addition, MySpace expressly advises subscribers that its 
access rights extend to all communications, including “private Myspace 
messages.”336   
 
[108] Facebook takes a different tact, notifying its members that it 
collects their data for marketing and operational purposes.337  That data 
specifically includes information gleaned from user messages.338  And if 
the trend toward site employee access of user communications was not 
apparent enough, LinkedIn warns its users not to post any “confidential” 
information to its site: “[I]f you have an idea or information that you 
would like to keep confidential . . . do not post it to any LinkedIn Group, 
into your Network Updates, or elsewhere on LinkedIn.”339 
 
2.  Site Access to In-house Counsel’s Communications 
May Destroy Confidentiality 
 
[109] Third party access to social media messages may very well doom a 
privilege claim over internal corporate messages involving in-house 
counsel.  This is because courts have generally taken a strict approach on 
the level of confidentiality required for a communication to be considered 
privileged.340  Anything short of absolute confidentiality between client                                                         
335 Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); 
see also Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314. 
 
336 See Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314. 
 
337 See Facebook Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 
338 See id. 
 
339 User Agreement, LINKEDIN § 2(10), http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (emphasis added).  
 
340 Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prev. Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, CIV. A. 10-
2008-CM-DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011) (citing 
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and counsel—such as a voluntary disclosure to a third party341—could 
either keep the privilege from attaching or cause it to be waived.342  A 
lone caveat to this rule is that courts must assess the issue of 
confidentiality from the standpoint of the client.343  Such a provision 
enables the privilege to attach only if the client reasonably understood that 
her discussion with counsel was to be confidential.344 
 
[110] With these standards in mind, it is difficult to conceive how 
communications between in-house counsel and corporate employees over 
social networks could be privileged except in the narrowest of 
circumstances.  Messages, posts, or other material communicated through 
an open forum setting would be voluntarily disclosed to the user 
communities of both counsel and the employees.  Such broad 
dissemination of user content to any number of third parties would 
undoubtedly vitiate an assertion of confidentiality regarding the message. 
                                                                                                                                           
New Jersey v. Sprint, 258 F.R.D. 421, 426 (D. Kan. 2009) (noting that the privilege is 
generally lost if the client voluntarily reveals the contents of an otherwise privileged 
discussion to a third party). 
 
341 This limitation does not include third party agents of lawyers.  See RICE, supra note 
51, at §3:3 at 13-21 (2010) (“To the extent that the communications would have been 
protected had they been with the attorney, courts have extended the privilege to the 
substantive advice and assistance of associates, investigators, interviewers, technical 
experts, accountants, physicians, patent agents, and other specialists in a variety of social 
and physical sciences.”). 
 
342 See, e.g., Hillsdale, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *8 (quoting Sprint, 258 F.R.D. at 
426). 
 
343 See RICE, supra note 51, at §6:6 at 6-40-6-41 (citations omitted). 
 
344 See Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., Ltd., 918 F. Supp. 491, 510 (D.N.H. 
1996) (observing that the “key question in determining the existence of a privileged 
communication is ‘whether the client reasonably understood the conference to be 
confidential.” (quoting Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984)). 
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[111] In like manner, site employee access to so-called private messages 
involving in-house lawyers may also destroy the confidentiality required 
to keep the communication privileged.345  Such a result would be 
consistent with the general legal principles on this issue, including that of 
the client’s “reasonable understanding.”  This is because corporate 
employees346 and counsel would likely be deemed to have understood, 
agreed to, and accepted the site terms of service, including site 
representative access to their direct messages.347 
 
[112] This is nonetheless an open issue as the courts have yet to weigh in 
on this specific privilege conundrum.  Furthermore, case authority on 
related issues appears to be divided.  On the one hand, various federal and 
state courts have made clear that social networks are not an “online 
lockbox of secrets.”348  For example, in McMillen v. Hummingbird 
Speedway, Inc., a Pennsylvania state court explained that parties could not 
expect to keep information “confidential” on social networks given the 
applicable terms of service.349  Referring to both Facebook and MySpace, 
                                                        
345 Mallory Allen & Aaron Orheim, Get Outta My Face(Book): The Discoverability of 
Social Networking Data and the Passwords Needed to Access Them, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. 
& ARTS 137, 146 (2012) (“Litigants attempting to invoke their right to privacy based on a 
reasonable expectation that information stored on either Facebook or MySpace is private 
may face difficulty overcoming the fact that according to the plain language of most 
social networking sites’ policies, little to no privacy is guaranteed.”). 
 
346 Barring some exceptional circumstance, the employees’ knowledge and understanding 
would be imputed to the organization under basic agency principles.  See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006). 
 
347 See, e.g., Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314.  
 
348 Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, at *8 (Pa. Com. Pl., Nov. 8, 
2011) (“Only the uninitiated or foolish could believe that Facebook is an online lockbox 
of secrets.”). 
 
349 McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-3010CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. 
Dec. LEXIS 270, at *5-6 (“Yet reading [Facebook and MySpace’s] terms and privacy 
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the court observed that users of those networks unequivocally agreed to 
allow site representatives to monitor and disclose their communications.350  
That, the court declared, “is wholly incommensurate with a claim of 
confidentiality.”351 
 
[113] On the other hand, direct messages have been found to be “private” 
given their similarity to e-mail.352  In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, a Los 
Angeles federal court refused to permit disclosure under the Stored 
Communications Act of certain communications that the plaintiff had sent 
through the direct messaging features of Facebook and MySpace.353  The 
court reasoned that those messages were “inherently private” since, just as 
with e-mail, they were “not readily accessible to the general public.”354  
Subsequent commentators have likewise joined the Crispin court on this 
issue, opining that direct messaging features are “sufficiently similar to e-
mail communications to apply the same jurisprudence.”355                                                                                                                                           
policies should dispel any notion that information one chooses to share, even if only with 
one friend, will not be disclosed to anybody else.”). 
 
350 Id. at *5-9 
 
351 Id. at *9. 
 
352 See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981-82 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 
353 See id. at 991. 
 
354 Id. at 991. 
 
355 Evan E. North, Note, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social 
Network Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1300 (2010) (arguing that the body of 
privacy law regarding e-mail correspondence should likewise apply to direct messages 
sent through social networking sites).  While there is perhaps a logical analogy between 
e-mail and direct social media communications for purposes of privacy law, that analogy 
is not equally applicable to the issue of confidentiality under the attorney-client privilege.  
As the Crispin court illustrates, individuals can enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their communications even though third parties may be privy to their messages. 
Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991; see supra notes 340-44 and accompanying text. 
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[114] Despite their respective merits, each line of authority is 
fundamentally limited as neither considers the issue of confidentiality 
through the lens of privilege law.  Nor do they take into account the role of 
heightened judicial scrutiny or the factual nuances that typically 
encompass a privilege claim involving in-house counsel.  Given these 
limitations, and in the absence of controlling authority, other case law 
must be explored for guidance.  The jurisprudence that arguably provides 
the most logical analogue on this issue involves decisions that have 
addressed the merits of employee workplace privilege claims. 
 
3.  Evaluating In-house Counsel’s Privilege Claims 
Under Employee Workplace Privilege Jurisprudence 
 
[115] Employee workplace privilege claims generally involve a scenario 
in which a company is seeking to discover e-mails that a former—and now 
adverse—employee sent to its counsel while employed with the company.  
As the former employee’s e-mails have either been sent over the company 
network and/or with a company-issued device, the employer argues that 
they are subject to company policies that eliminate any reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the workplace.  Without an expectation of 
privacy, the employer contends that confidentiality is absent from the 
worker’s e-mails with counsel.  The lack of confidentiality, in turn, 
destroys an otherwise defensible claim of privilege. 
 
[116] To stave off production, the employee typically maintains that its 
expectation of confidentiality in the e-mails was reasonable.  The worker 
will often point to a lack of employee knowledge and/or employer 
enforcement of workplace privacy policies.  In essence, the employee 
asserts that a type of estoppel arises given the lack of or arbitrary 
adherence to those policies. 
 
[117] In response to such arguments, the judiciary has fashioned a fact 
intensive analysis to determine whether or not the employee’s expectation 
of privacy was reasonable under the circumstances.  That analysis 
generally turns on whether the employer could access worker e-mails, 
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whether the employer monitored worker e-mail usage, and whether the 
employer provided notice of its policy on these issues to its workers.  
These three factors—access, monitoring, and notice—may be seen as 
similarly essential for determining whether social media communications 
involving in-house counsel are sufficiently confidential to be privileged.  
They are considered in detail in In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.,356 the 
leading case on employee workplace privilege claims.357 
 
[118] In Global Crossing, the court was asked to resolve a privilege 
dispute similar to the scenario described in this Subsection.358  To 
determine whether the employee had an “objectively reasonable” 
expectation of confidentiality in the e-mails exchanged with his lawyer, 
the court evaluated the tripartite factors of access, monitoring, and 
notice.359  With respect to access, there was no reasonable dispute that the 
employer could review employee e-mails.360  Despite such access, the 
company neither enacted nor enforced a workplace privacy policy.361  Nor 
were certain employees specifically notified that their e-mails would be                                                         
356 See generally In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 
357 See, e.g., Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1108-09 (W.D. 
Wash. 2011) (“[M]ost state and federal courts evaluating whether an employee has 
waived the attorney-client privileged status of personal communications transmitted, 
stored, or saved onto a company computer or laptop, have applied the four-factor test 
initially set forth in In re Asia Global.”) (citations omitted); In re Reserve Fund Sec. & 
Derivative Litig., 275 F.R.D. 154, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“In In re Asia Global 
Crossing, Ltd., the court set forth a four-factor test — which has been widely adopted. . . 
.”) (citations omitted). 
 
358 In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. at 251. 
 
359 See id. at 259.  
 
360 Id. (Asia Global clearly had access to its own servers and any other part o the system 
where e-mail messages were stored . . . .”) 
 
361 See id.  
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monitored.362  Taking into account both the lack of enforcement and 
notice regarding the policy, the court rejected the company’s arguments 
regarding confidentiality and sustained the employee’s privilege claim.363 
 
[119] The Global Crossing factors have been repeatedly applied to 
resolve comparable employee workplace privilege claims.  In several of 
those decisions, courts have found that the employee maintained a 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality.  For example, in Curto v. 
Medical World Communications, Inc., the plaintiff’s claims of privilege 
were upheld since her employer generally neglected to monitor worker e-
mail usage consistent with its stated policy of doing so.364  A similar result 
was found in Convertino v. United States Department of Justice where the 
government agency’s privacy policy did not proscribe personal employee 
e-mail and did not notify the plaintiff that the agency would monitor his e-
mail.365 
 
[120] Various other decisions following Global Crossing have reached a 
contrary result on the issue of confidentiality and have rejected employee 
privilege claims.  In In re Royce Homes, LP, employee assertions of 
confidentiality were dashed by a company’s electronic communications 
policy.366  That policy “explicitly banned confidential communications 
over its computer system, and cautioned employees that the [company] 
could access, view, read, or retrieve employees’ personal communications                                                         
362 See id.  
 
363 See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. at 261.  
 
364 Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 29387, at *20-24 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006). 
 
365 See Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 
366 See In re Royce Homes, LP, 449 B.R. 709, 744 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) appeal 
dismissed, 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
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at any time.”367  Similarly, the court in In re Reserve Fund Securities and 
Derivative Litigation found that the employer’s consistent monitoring of 
employee e-mail doomed any assertion of confidentiality by the 
employee.368  And in Hanson v. First National Bank, the worker’s 
knowledge of the employer’s e-mail access and monitoring policies 
defeated his asserted expectation of confidentiality.369 
 
[121] The three factors emphasized by Global Crossing and its progeny 
should be the determinative factors that the court employs to assess the 
confidentiality of direct messages involving in-house counsel.  Just as in 
Royce Homes, Reserve Fund, and Hanson, a corporate client’s reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality could be destroyed if a social network 
notifies internal counsel or other employees of its intention to monitor and 
access their communications.  This is particularly the case if the party 
opposing the privilege claim establishes that the site regularly enforced 
that policy. Faithful adherence to the monitoring policy would make the 
concerns raised in the Global Crossing and Curto decisions inapposite. 
 
[122] Nevertheless, a lack of notice to site users or spotty enforcement of 
site policies might still allow a claim of privilege to stand.  Despite site 
terms such as those from Reddit and MySpace that expressly provide for 
monitoring and even interception of direct message content, a site’s failure 
to abide by those terms could land the privilege question within the scope 
of the Global Crossing and Curto holdings.  Moreover, a site’s failure to 
articulate an intelligible policy or to properly notify users of that policy 
could bring the claim in line with Convertino.  Under either of these 
scenarios, counsel’s privilege claim could be sustained.                                                         
367 Id. 
 
368 In re Reserve Fund Secs. & Derivative Litig., 275 F.R.D. 154, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(applying the Global Crossing factors to a marital communications privilege claim) 
(citation omitted). 
 
369 Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at *8, *9 
(S.D.W.Va. Oct. 31, 2011). 
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4.  Heightened Scrutiny as the Deciding Factor 
 
[123] While it is difficult to reach a conclusive determination without 
guidance from decisional authority, heightened judicial scrutiny may very 
well tip the scales against in-house counsel’s privilege assertions.  Given 
the complications that e-mail has introduced into the privilege analysis and 
judicial wariness regarding corporate zones of silence, courts are likely to 
view with skepticism claims involving social media communications.370  
This position is substantiated by the disdain courts have expressed 
regarding so-called privacy settings that litigants have unsuccessfully 
relied on to stave off the production of non-privileged data from social 
networks.371   
 
[124] These combined factors suggest that courts could default to a strict 
approach with respect to confidentiality.372  Under such an approach, 
courts would strictly construe the Global Crossing factors to find that 
sites’ monitoring policies negate any reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality.  And without confidentiality, the claim of privilege would 
be destroyed.  All of which underscores the importance of both in-house 
counsel and its client taking appropriate precautions to prevent such a 
development. 
 
[125] Such safeguards, however, should not be limited to social media 
communications.  The same concerns regarding confidentiality likewise                                                         
370 See discussion supra Parts II-III. 
 
371 See, e.g., Patterson v. Turner Constr. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (App. Div. 2011) 
(“The postings on plaintiff's online Facebook account, if relevant, are not shielded from 
discovery merely because plaintiff used the service's privacy settings to restrict access.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 
372 See Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prev. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Nos. 10-2008-CM-
DJW, 10–2068–CM–DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *10 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 
2011). 
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permeate the analysis over the use of cloud computing to store internal 
lawyers’ privileged communications. 
 
B.  Communications Stored in the Cloud May Lose Their 
Privileged Character 
 
[126] Between e-mail and social networks, companies are inundated on a 
daily basis with terabytes of electronic communications.  In many 
instances, those messages and other ESI have overwhelmed company 
servers, storage archives, and backup media.373  To address the logistical 
challenge of maintaining vast volumes of electronic data, organizations 
have turned to cloud computing as a storage alternative.374  With the 
promise of low information retention costs375 and quick data retrieval, the 
                                                        
373 See Philip Favro, Look Before You Leap!  Avoid Pitfalls When Moving e-Discovery to 
the Cloud, LAW J. NEWSLS., Apr. 2012, available at 
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_legaltech/30_1/news/156573-1.html. 
 
374 See, e.g., Ned Smith, Why More Businesses Are Using Cloud Computing, CNBC (July 
25, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48319526/Why_More_Businesses_Are_Using_Cloud_Computi
ng (“More than eight in 10 companies currently use some form of cloud solution, and 
more than half plan to increase cloud investments by 10 percent or more this year . . . . 
[M]ore than half of micro (one to nine employees) and small (10 to 99 employees) 
businesses use cloud-based business productivity applications.”); Nicole Black, 
Introduction, to GLOBAL CLOUD SURVEY REPORT 2012, LEGAL IT PROFESSIONALS 4, 7 
(2012), available at http://www.legalitprofessionals.com/wpcs/cloudsurvey2012.pdf 
(“[N]early all respondents acknowledged that cloud computing would ultimately overtake 
on-premise computing in the legal industry . . . .”). 
 
375 For the enterprise, the allure of cloud computing is cost savings.  See Smith, supra 
note 374.  The cost to store company ESI in the cloud may be significantly lower than the 
cost to add more hardware to accommodate growing digital stores.  In addition, cloud 
computing offers the opportunity to slash overhead expenses by decreasing employee 
headcount and reducing server repair and maintenance. 
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cloud computing concept has been widely embraced and is one of the most 
popular technologies adopted by organizations.376 
 
[127] Despite the potential for efficient commercial enterprise, cloud 
computing offers a troublesome privilege trap for company 
communications with internal lawyers.377  Just as social networking site 
employees are privy to direct messages involving counsel, providers of 
cloud computing services often have access and monitoring rights to a 
company’s cloud hosted data.  Memorialized in service level agreements 
(SLA), those rights may very well destroy the confidentiality required to 
keep in-house counsel’s discussions privileged.378 
 
[128] In this Subsection, I review the basic underpinnings of the cloud 
computing services model and some common SLA terms that enable 
provider employees to access company data.  I also discuss how the 
judiciary would address the viability of in-house counsel’s privilege 
claims through the kaleidoscope of the Global Crossing factors and 
heightened scrutiny. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
376 Cf. SYMANTEC, AVOIDING THE HIDDEN COSTS OF THE CLOUD 4, 8, (2013), available 
at https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-state-of-cloud-global-
results-2013.en-us.pdf (finding that “[o]rganizations of all sizes are moving ahead with 
cloud implementations” and that 34% of organizations surveyed have had eDiscovery 
requests for cloud data but 66% missed the discovery deadline and 41% were unable to 
meet the discovery request). 
 
377 See Cindy Pham, E-Discovery in the Cloud Era: What’s a Litigant to Do?, 5 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 139, 139-142 (describing cloud computing, summarizing 
“exponential” growth in the cloud market, and discussing related discovery problems). 
 
378 See discussion infra Part VI.B.2. 
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1.  SLA Terms that Enable Provider Access to Cloud 
Hosted Data 
 
[129] While the name “cloud computing” implies a celestial venue for 
data storage, the term generally refers to organizations that host company 
data in a brick and mortar facility.379  Like the traditional warehouse 
setting, the typical cloud service provider agrees to host company 
materials for a fee.380  To reach the provider’s physical repository, the 
company transmits the data electronically through cyberspace.381  Once 
stored in the provider’s cloud archive, company ESI can be accessed and 
retrieved on demand by corporate employees.382 
 
[130] Nevertheless, company employees may not be the only individuals 
with access rights to that data.383  Depending on the nature of the SLA,                                                         
379 See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &TECH., THE 
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 1-3 (2011), available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.  “Public clouds” fit 
most closely into the paradigm discussed in this Subsection.  However, certain providers 
of “private clouds” and “hybrid clouds” also fall within the scope of this discussion since 
they offer third party hosted services.  Nevertheless, the cloud industry typically 
characterizes a private cloud provider as furnishing a third party service that is hosted on 
the contracting company’s site and behind the firewall of that company.  In contrast, a 
hybrid cloud “is a composition of two or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, 
community, or public)” bound together for interoperability.  Id. 
 
380 For example, Dropbox fees range from $795/year for small (fewer than five) member 
teams to $31,420/year for large (250) member teams.  Pricing, DROPBOX, 
https://www.dropbox.com/business/pricing (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 
381 See Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://www.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm (last visited Nov. 
3, 2013). 
 
382 Id. 
 
383 See Roberta Cooper Ramo, Ethics for American Lawyers in the Age of Twitter and the 
Cloud, 72 MONT. L. REV. 227, 233 (2011) (“It is less expensive to use so-called cloud 
servers to save massive amounts of material and at the same time have it accessible from 
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representatives from the cloud provider may also be able to review, 
inspect, and even block data transmissions.  For example, the popular 
enterprise cloud provider Dropbox unequivocally informs its customers 
that certain of its employees will have access to customer data “for the 
reasons stated in our privacy policy . . . .”384  While those reasons include 
common caveats such as compliance with third party legal demands,385 
they also include the broad exception of “protect[ing] Dropbox’s property 
rights.”386  Dropbox also grants “third party companies and individuals” 
access to customer data ostensibly to help improve the level of service that 
Dropbox provides.387 
 
[131] Box, another common corporate provider, has similar access rights 
to customer data.388  In addition to reserving its right to access and turn 
over customer data in response to outside legal requests, Box may also 
intercept and review data: “We retain the right to block or otherwise 
prevent delivery of any type of file, e-mail or other communication to or 
                                                                                                                                          
virtually any place on the planet. The question is, of course, if it is accessible to you, to 
whom else might the material be available on an unauthorized basis? . . . . Are you 
putting your clients’ confidential information at risk?”). 
 
384 Security Overview, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited Nov. 3, 
2013). 
 
385 Dropbox Privacy Policy, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/privacy (last updated 
Apr. 10, 2013).  Such “demands” are highly ambiguous and remain undefined throughout 
the SLA. 
 
386 Id. 
 
387 Id. 
 
388 Quentin Hardy, Box and Dropbox Come of Age in Cloud Computing, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 31, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/box-and-dropbox-
coming-of-age-in-cloud-computing/; Box Terms of Service, BOX, 
http://box.com/static/html/terms.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2013). 
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from the Service as part of our efforts to protect the Service, protect our 
customers, or stop you from breaching these Terms.”389   
 
[132] The iCloud service Apple offers to consumers and small 
businesses is likewise invasive of customer-stored data.390  Under a 
section of the iCloud SLA entitled “Access To Your Account and 
Content,” Apple specifies that it may open and review stored data to 
ensure the customer’s “compliance with any part of this Agreement.”391  
This includes broadly defined scenarios such as addressing “security, 
fraud or technical issues,” or protecting “the rights, property or safety of 
Apple, its users, a third party, or the public as required or permitted by 
law.”392  Additionally, Apple may seize customer data that it finds to be 
objectionable “without prior notice and in its sole discretion . . . .”393 
 
2.  Cloud Provider Access to In-house Counsel’s 
Communications May Eliminate Confidentiality 
 
[133] While Box, DropBox, and iCloud represent just a small sampling 
of a growing industry, their SLA terms exemplify the type of third party                                                         
389 Box Terms of Service, supra note 388. 
 
390 iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/legal/icloud/en/terms.html (last updated Sept. 18, 2013). 
 
391 Id.  
 
392 Id. 
 
393 See id.; see also Robert X. Cringely, Hollywood Whodunit: What’s Eating E-mails in 
iCloud?, INFOWORLD (Nov. 19, 2012), 
https://www.infoworld.com/t/cringely/hollywood-whodunit-whats-eating-e-mails-in-
icloud-207335?page=0,1; Jared Newman, Barely Legal Teens: Apple iCloud E-mails with 
Naughty Phrases Deleted, TIME (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://techland.time.com/2013/03/01/classic-apple-icloud-e-mails-deleted-for-naughty-
phrases/ (reporting that iCloud blocked the transmission of a movie script sent via e-mail 
due to allegedly objectionable language).  
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access that could destroy the confidentiality required to keep stored copies 
of in-house counsel’s internal communications privileged.394  However, 
given the absence of governing case authority and the similarity of this 
issue to that of social networking site access to user messages, courts will 
likely turn to Global Crossing to determine the issue of confidentiality.395 
 
[134] The impact of the Global Crossing factors—access, monitoring, 
and notice—would undoubtedly turn on the cloud provider’s SLA.396  If a 
provider’s SLA has terms similar to those promulgated by Box, DropBox, 
and iCloud, the issues of access and notice would weigh against 
confidentiality.  Some courts, like in Royce Homes, may quickly conclude 
that a provider’s notice of unambiguous access to cloud hosted data may 
vitiate any claim of confidentiality over counsel’s stored 
communications.397  For other judges, a determination of the issue might 
instead come down to the company’s knowledge that its provider could                                                         
394 Cf. Yenny Teng-Lee, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protection for Users’ Information 
Stored in the Cloud: The Case of Mint.com, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 65, 70-72, 79-84 
(2012) (analyzing the third party doctrine and the impact of cloud SLAs on users’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the fourth amendment context). 
 
395 See JAY E. GRENIG ET AL., 1 EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL EVIDENCE § 2:11 (2012) (“Case 
law has not yet caught up with cloud computing, but legal commentators have begun to 
explore the possible ramifications of this new ESI phenomenon.”); supra Part IV.A.3. 
 
396 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 
397 See In re Royce Homes, LP, 449 B.R. 709, 744 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) appeal 
dismissed, 466 B.R. 81, 94 (S.D.Tex. 2012).; see also REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE 
BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY 53 (2009), available at 
http://old.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu60/PrivacyInitiativeTaskForceHome/NYSB
APrivacyRptFinalHOD4309.pdf (“In general, these TOU and Privacy Policies do not 
afford the necessary level of restriction and protection for privileged client information 
and attorney work product, or information protected by a right of privacy, so that an 
attorney professionally and ethically cannot agree to subject such information to those 
TOU and Privacy Policy.  In that case it will be impermissible for an attorney to use 
cloud computing, cloud storage or virtual computing in his or her practice.”). 
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access those privileged communications.398  Similar to Hanson, such 
knowledge could potentially defeat the enterprise’s expectation of 
confidentiality.399 
 
[135] The more reasoned analysis, however, would take into account the 
critical factor of monitoring, i.e., enforcement of the SLA.  Parties 
opposing in-house counsel’s claim of privilege would more likely prevail 
in motion practice if they could show that providers like iCloud regularly 
flag and block stored communications or other cloud-hosted data.400  Like 
the holding in Reserve Fund, evidence of consistent monitoring by the 
cloud provider would likely defeat an assertion of confidentiality by the 
corporate claimant.401  In contrast, arbitrary monitoring or an overall lack 
of enforcement would probably leave a privilege claim undisturbed.402  As                                                         
398 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S.746, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“And 
employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable 
expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly 
communicated.”). 
 
399 See Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at 
*23 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011) (finding that a party, knowing that his employer “could 
access and monitor his e-mail communications with his criminal attorney, had no 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy or confidentiality in them and effectively 
waived the attorney-client privilege” in using his employer’s computer system to 
communicate with his attorney.). 
 
400 See supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
 
401 See Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig. v. Reserve Mgmt. Co., 275 F.R.D. 154, 
164 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457(RRM)(RML), 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *33-34 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (finding that an 
employee had no reasonable expectation or confidentiality in e-mails sent through his 
employee account because the employer “had a clear and long-consistent policy of 
limiting an employee’s personal use of its systems, reserving its right to monitor an 
employee’s usage of the system, and making abundantly clear to its employees . . .that 
they had no right to privacy when using them.”). 
 
402 See, e.g., Haynes v. Office of Att’y Gen., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162 (D. Kan. 2003) 
(finding, despite a daily warning against an expectation of privacy, that inconsistent 
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the Global Crossing and Curto cases teach, consistent enforcement of the 
provider’s access rights is the touchstone of the confidentiality analysis. 403 
 
3.  Heightened Scrutiny May Tip the Scales on the Issue 
of Privilege 
 
[136] How a court ultimately decides this issue of privilege may depend 
on how the heightened scrutiny test is applied.  While e-mail technology 
has generally increased the judiciary’s cynicism toward in-house privilege 
claims, that attitude may not necessarily extend to the use of cloud 
computing.  This is because many state bar organizations, as well as the 
American Bar Association, have approved the use of cloud providers to 
store client communications and other information.404  The seal of 
approval from reputable bar organizations regarding cloud computing 
could distinguish this innovation from the more notorious reputation of 
social networking sites.  
 
[137] Nevertheless, the sanction from bar organizations is typically 
contingent on the due diligence that lawyers exercise to ensure that 
appropriate safeguards are deployed to preserve confidentiality.405  Such                                                                                                                                           
enforcement and other factual considerations suggested “the plaintiff’s expectation of 
privacy was objectively reasonable”). 
 
403 See supra Part IVA.3. 
 
404 See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398 
(1995) (noting the requirement of reasonable effort to ensure no unauthorized disclosure); 
Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/res
ources/charts_fyis/cloud-ethics-chart.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
 
405 Bob Ambrogi, Florida Legal Ethics Opinion Clears Way for Cloud Computing, 
CATALYST (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/2013/02/florida-legal-
ethics-opinion-clears-way-for-cloud-computing/ (noting that many states have adopted 
ethics opinions regarding the use of cloud computing and that they almost universally 
condone the use of cloud storage “provided [lawyers] exercise due diligence to ensure 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 
81  
due diligence may entail the inclusion of specific confidentiality terms in 
the SLA.406  It might alternatively require the execution of a separate 
confidentiality agreement with the cloud provider.407  While those 
measures may vary from state to state, and depending on different factual 
scenarios, bar organizations and commentators generally agree that 
counsel must take “professionally recognized, reasonably appropriate 
steps to protect the information stored ‘in the cloud . . . .’”408  Such advice, 
which is typically directed toward outside counsel, is equally applicable to                                                                                                                                           
that the cloud provider maintains adequate safeguards to protect the confidentiality and 
security of client information”). 
 
406 See, e.g., Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
2011-200, 13 (2011), available at http://www.slaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2011-
200-Cloud-Computing.pdf (“Generally, the consensus is that, while ‘cloud computing’ is 
permissible, lawyers should proceed with caution because they have an ethical duty to 
protect sensitive client data.  In service to that essential duty, and in order to meet the 
standard of reasonable care, other Committees have determined that attorneys must (1) 
include terms in any agreement with the provider that require the provider to preserve the 
confidentiality and security of the data, and (2) be knowledgeable about how providers 
will handle the data entrusted to them.  Some Committees have also raised ethical 
concerns regarding confidentiality issues with third-party access or general electronic 
transmission (e.g., web-based [e-mail]) and these conclusions are consistent with 
opinions about emergent ‘cloud computing’ technologies.”). 
 
407 See, e.g., N. C. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 6 (2011), Subscribing to Software as a 
Service While Fulfilling the Duties of Confidentiality and Preservation of Client Property 
(last modified Jan. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/printopinion.asp?id=855 (follow “Adopted Opinions” 
hyperlink under “Ethics” tab; then search by title) (providing a list of recommended 
security measures a lawyer should take when working with a cloud provider, including 
issuing an agreement on “how the vender will handle confidential client information in 
keeping with the lawyer’s professional responsibilities”). 
 
408 See George Jacobs & Kenneth Laurence, Liability Under Ethical Standards, in 51 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES, PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE § 17.6 n. 12 (2013) 
(discussing Massachusetts rules of professional responsibility in relation to lawyers using 
cloud services). 
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in-house attorneys, particularly given their dual role as both counsel and 
client on behalf of the organization.409 
 
[138] Thus, if in-house lawyers and their client organizations take 
adequate measures to ensure the confidentiality of their cloud hosted 
messages, courts may very well apply a more deferential level of scrutiny 
and let their privilege claims stand.410  Such a development would be 
welcomed across the spectrum of industry verticals given the ubiquitous 
adoption of cloud computing.  It might also provide some much needed 
direction regarding the impact of BYOD on the privilege given the 
interplay between this innovation and cloud computing. 
 
C.  BYOD May Jeopardize the Confidentiality of In-house 
Counsel’s Communications 
 
[139] The hottest technology trend affecting businesses today is 
undoubtedly BYOD.411  BYOD is driven by companies that are competing 
for top industry talent, which often prizes the use of SFF devices in the 
workplace.412  Faced with demands for high-end gadgets equipped with 
the latest and greatest applications, companies must decide whether to                                                         
409 See United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp.2d 1065, 1076-77 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (observing that in-house counsel invariably occupy the roles of lawyer and client 
on behalf of the organization). 
 
410 To the extent client and counsel took reasonable steps in this regard, subsequent third 
party access to communications could arguably be considered an “inadvertent disclosure” 
and not a waiver of the privilege.  See FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 
411 See Greg Day, Overview from Greg Day On the Topic of Bring Your Own Device—
The Challenges Facing Today and How This Trend Will Evolve in the Future, 
SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/tv/news/details.jsp?vid=1555866669001 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2013) (describing the BYOD trend and associated challenges). 
 
412 See Matt DeWolf, Next Challenges for BYOD, MICROSOFT (Jan. 4, 2013), 
https://www.microsoft.com/enterprise/it-trends/mobility/articles/Next-Challenges-for-
BYOD.aspx. 
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spring for such high cost items or lose a potentially brilliant employee to a 
competitor.413 
 
[140] For many organizations, BYOD policies provide an acceptable 
middle ground to this quandary.  With a BYOD policy in place, companies 
allow their employees to use their own devices for work.414  While this 
enables the enterprise to slake its workers’ thirst for cutting edge 
innovations, it also provides a cost savings opportunity to the employer.415  
With enhanced worker satisfaction and decreased company costs, BYOD 
seems like a win-win for everyone involved. 
 
[141] Everyone, that is, except for the in-house lawyers whose privilege 
claims could be compromised.  For while BYOD has a tremendous upside 
for both sides of the employment equation, it presents a difficult challenge 
for preserving the confidentiality of counsel’s communications.  This is 
due to the lack of corporate control introduced by BYOD over those 
messages and other ESI.  In this Subsection, I examine the two common 
scenarios in which a lack of control may create issues with confidentiality.  
I also discuss the effect of heightened scrutiny on BYOD-impacted 
privilege assertions. 
 
                                                        
413 Cf. Tom Kaneshige, Infographic: BYOD’s Meteoric Rise, CIO (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://blogs.cio.com/consumer-it/17707/infographic-byods-meteoric-rise (noting that 
“[sixty-three] percent of employees believe BYOD positively influences their view of the 
company.”). 
 
414 STEPHEN S. WU,  A LEGAL GUIDE TO ENTERPRISE MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT: 
MANAGING BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE (BYOD) AND EMPLOYER-ISSUED DEVICE 
PROGRAMS 15 (2013). 
 
415 See, e.g., Thor Olavsrud, How BYOD Saved VMWare $2 Million, CIO (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.cio.com/article/728095/How_BYOD_Saved_VMware_2_Million (“[A] 
number of high-profile companies—Cisco, VMWare and Ingram Micro among them—
have reported significant savings [with BYOD].”).  
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1.  BYOD Challenges to Maintaining the Confidentiality 
of Privileged Messages 
 
[142] The attraction of BYOD is also the inherent cause of its problems.  
By allowing the employee to conduct work duties on a personal device, 
the company yields a substantial amount of control over corporate 
information to the employee.416  This lack of employer control could 
compromise the confidentiality of privileged discussions in two different 
scenarios. 
 
[143] The first involves employee use of personal cloud storage 
providers in connection with the BYOD dynamic.  Employees often turn 
to such providers to facilitate data transfers to company databases and to 
act as a storage medium.417  Nevertheless, such providers, which include 
Box, DropBox, and iCloud, often grant their employees broad access 
rights to review, intercept, and block customer data.418  As detailed in the 
previous Subsection, such third party access could impugn the 
confidentiality of in-house lawyers’ privilege assertions. 
 
[144] While the prospect of cloud employee access is troubling enough, 
a more problematic scenario involves the use of the employee’s computer 
by her family, friends, or others.419  The typical company safeguards over                                                         
416 See Henry Z. Horbaczewski & Ronald I. Raether, Know the Privacy and Security 
Issues Before Inviting Employee-Owned Devices to the Party, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2012, 
at 71, 72 (“Security starts with knowing what data resides where, and who has access to 
that data.  With employee-owned devices, the main unique issue from a security 
perspective is loss of control.”). 
 
417 See Walton, supra note 10 (highlighting data security as a primary BYOD risk, 
especially when personal cloud storage is involved). 
 
418 See supra Part IV.B. 
 
419 See Bryan T. Allen, The Legal Side of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), PARR BROWN 
GEE & LOVELESS (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.parrbrown.com/newsevents/articles/view/272 (“The most important 
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a workplace device (login credentials, encryption, etc.) may be nonexistent 
or lacking in sophistication to prevent use by others.420  Worse, login 
credentials might be shared or a device could be left on without security 
measures.  Under these scenarios, it is not difficult to envision how a 
roommate, teenage child, or even a stranger could take, text, or tweet 
company information.421  Setting aside the potential for misappropriation 
of trade secrets of other proprietary information,422 such third party access 
could destroy the confidentiality of any privileged messages found on the 
device. 
                                                                                                                                           
provisions in a BYOD policy are the provisions designed to protect the company’s 
confidential information from getting into the hands of third parties or being used by an 
employee for non-company purposes.”). 
 
420 See Reece Hirsch, What Every General Counsel Should Know About Privacy and 
Security: 10 Trends for 2013, 12 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 128 (2013), available at 
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/BNA_WhatEveryGCShouldKnow_28jan13.pdf (“If a 
company's security policy calls for encryption of all company-owned mobile devices, but 
an employee uses his or her own unencrypted smartphone to store company data and that 
phone is hacked, then it could be argued that the company has not met the standard for 
reasonable security.”); Horbaczewski, supra note 416, at 71, 72. 
 
421 See Lisa Milam-Perez, Littler Mendelson Attorney Warns of Pitfalls of “BYOD”, 
WOLTERS KLUWER (July 29, 2012), 
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2012/07/29/littler-mendelson-attorney-
warns-of-pitfalls-of-byod/ (describing best practices for BYOD policies: “No use by 
friends and family members!  ‘I got the most guff for this one . . . and I imagine you 
probably will too.  I know your kid likes to play Angry Birds, and I know you bought it 
with your own money,’ but it’s an essential control . . . .”); Privacy Roundtable 
Highlights, RECORDER (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202591017099 (discussing the risk of 
misappropriation of company data by family members sharing devices that may also be 
used for work under BYOD policies). 
 
422 See PHILIP BERKOWITZ ET AL.,  THE “BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE” TO WORK 
MOVEMENT: ENGINEERING PRAC’TICAL EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW COMPLIANCE 
SOLUTIONS 10 (2012) (describing legal challenges to BYOD policies such as 
implementing legal holds, protecting trade secrets, and proving misappropriation). 
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2.  Judicial Treatment of Privilege Claims Affected by 
BYOD 
 
[145] The judiciary’s treatment of BYOD-impacted privilege assertions 
will likely be similar to the analysis used to address claims affected by 
cloud computing.423  To the extent such privilege disputes arise from the 
use of cloud providers, the legal analysis under the Global Crossing 
factors would be equally applicable.  In contrast, the third party device 
access scenario would probably be evaluated on the given facts 
surrounding the access that others had to the employee device.  However, 
the deciding factor under either of these situations would likely focus on 
how closely client and counsel followed best industry practices to 
maintain the confidentiality of those messages.424 
 
[146] Companies that make little to no effort to incorporate safeguards 
into their BYOD infrastructure can expect more extensive judicial probing 
into their assertions of confidentiality and privilege.425  Just as courts have 
belittled the efficacy of privacy settings in preventing the discovery of 
social media communications, they may also treat BYOD-related claims 
with disdain if neither client nor counsel takes reasonable steps to prevent 
unauthorized disclosures of privileged material.426  The reason for this is 
grounded in the basic underpinnings of privilege law: “[C]ourts . . . may 
‘grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their 
                                                        
423 See supra Part IV.B. 
 
424 To that end, the guidelines that various bar organizations promulgated regarding the 
implications for the privilege by the use of cloud computing would undoubtedly figure 
into this analysis.  See supra notes 404-07. 
 
425 Hirsch, supra note 420. 
 
426 See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 502(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 
(2013). 
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own precautions warrant.’”427  Those companies that fail to jealously 
guard confidentiality with best practices for BYOD will likely lose the 
privileged status for their internal lawyers’ communications.428 
 
[147] On the other hand, where “professionally recognized” and 
“reasonably appropriate steps” are taken to better secure data transfers as 
well as employee personal devices, a court would likely be more 
deferential in scrutinizing a company’s assertions of confidentiality.  As 
discussed in Part V, such steps typically include the development of a 
cogent and reasonable BYOD policy, appropriate education of company 
employees, and deployment of effective, enabling technologies.  Those 
same recommendations generally apply to the other problems created for 
the privilege by e-mail, social networking sites, and cloud computing. 
 
V.  SUGGESTED PRACTICES FOR ENHANCING THE DEFENSIBILITY OF IN-
HOUSE COUNSEL’S PRIVILEGE CLAIMS 
 
[148] Given the role of heightened judicial scrutiny and the impact of 
disruptive technologies, companies should adopt practices to ensure that 
the protections surrounding their in-house counsel’s privilege claims are 
not eroded any further.  In this Part, I propose some practical suggestions 
for accomplishing this objective. 
 
A.  Reduce the Indiscriminate Use of E-mail 
 
[149] The first step that companies can take in reducing the 
indiscriminate use of e-mail is to develop an actionable e-mail use policy.  
Such a policy would encourage workers to cut back on the promiscuous 
use of e-mail with in-house lawyers. For example, lay employees could be 
trained regarding the proper use of a “cc,” “forward,” and “reply” with                                                         
427 Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prev. Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, CIV. A. 10-
2008-CM-DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011) (citing 
New Jersey v. Sprint, 258 F.R.D. 421, 426 (D. Kan. 2009)). 
 
428 See id. 
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respect to counsel.  While the nature of that training would vary depending 
on the needs of a particular organization, it would likely include an overall 
stop and think mandate before adding counsel to a message.  For as the 
Vioxx, Gabapentin, and Ameritech cases make clear, perfunctorily 
including counsel on e-mails either for convenience or for tactical reasons 
invites heightened judicial scrutiny.429 
 
[150] A specific suggestion derived from the Vioxx case would be to 
encourage workers to communicate by separate e-mail with internal 
lawyers when they must be brought “into the loop” on a specific matter.430  
Such a practice would enhance a privilege claim since the e-mail would be 
devoid of other lay recipients.  It is the inclusion of various lay employees 
in an e-mail to counsel that often leads to doubts about whether the 
message was focused on legal advice.  As the Vioxx case teaches, stripping 
out non-essential, lay recipients tends to strengthen a privilege claim.431  
In addition, it clarifies and enhances the objection in the claimant’s 
privilege log. 
 
B.  Limit the Privilege Log Burden 
 
[151] The challenges of preparing an acceptable privilege log—masses 
of potentially privileged e-mails that must be painstakingly reviewed 
before each claim is reduced to a concise statement —are well known to 
clients, counsel, and the courts.  Besides reducing the quantity of 
potentially privileged e-mails, the best way to circumvent this costly and 
tedious process that draws so much judicial scrutiny is for the litigants to 
enter into a stipulation that limits the scope of a log.  Indeed, Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(f) specifically requires the parties to develop a                                                         
429 See supra Part III. 
 
430 See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 805-06 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 
431 See id. 
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“discovery plan” that addresses “any issues about claims of privilege.”432  
At the Rule 26(f) discovery conference, the parties could explore possible 
limitations on privilege logs such as: (1) only identifying the last-in-time 
e-mail in a particular string;433 (2) preparing a privilege log by category;434 
or (3) eliminating the log altogether.435 
 
[152] If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, they should seek 
judicial involvement to help fashion an acceptable protocol.436  Regardless 
of the method, parties that narrow the extent of their privilege log 
obligations will almost certainly reduce the level of judicial wrangling 
over their privilege assertions. 
 
C.  Use Technology to Identify Draft E-mails 
 
[153] Organizations will likely need to deploy technology to prevent the 
mistaken production of draft e-mails.  This could include tools that help 
match up draft e-mails with their final, privileged counterparts.437  
Alternatively, there are technologies that can isolate privileged drafts and 
thereby increase the chance of removing them from a production set.438                                                          
432 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 
433 See Facciola & Redgrave, supra note 245, at 49. 
 
434 See SEC v. Nacchio, No. 05-cv-00480-MSK-CBS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5435, *31 
(D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2007) (approving the concept of a privilege log by category). 
 
435 See Brady, supra note 222. 
 
436 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 
437 See, e.g., Our Technology, CONTENT ANALYST COMPANY, 
http://www.contentanalyst.com/html/tech/technologies_near_duplication.html (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
 
438 See Liesa L. Richtera, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal 
Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1677 (2013) (describing the use of 
predictive coding technology in privilege reviews); Nicholas Barry, Note, Man Versus 
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These innovations, however, are not a panacea for addressing the issue.  
The problematic drafts in Oracle were produced despite the use of 
“electronic scanning mechanisms.”439  Instead of placing complete 
reliance on technology, companies should develop and integrate with that 
technology a complementary privilege review process.  That process 
would likely incorporate audits and other quality control checks to ensure 
that drafts do not slip through the proverbial cracks. 
 
D.  Provide a Hosted Alternative to Social Networking Sites 
 
[154] Third party access to social media communications involving in-
house lawyers may very well drive companies to ban counsel from using 
social networks for business communications.  While such a policy could 
theoretically address the issue, it would likely be difficult to enforce.440  In 
addition, it may prove unpopular given that many employees, including 
lawyers, prefer communicating over social networks.441 
 
[155] To address these issues, a company may consider deploying an on-
site social network environment.442  Conceptually similar to private clouds 
that house data behind the company firewall, an on-site network could be 
jointly developed with a third party provider to ensure specific levels of                                                                                                                                           
Machine Review: The Showdown Between Hordes of Discovery Lawyers and a 
Computer-Utilizing Predictive-Coding Technology, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 343, 
370-71 (2013) (arguing that the use of predictive coding technology in privilege reviews 
should satisfy standards of reasonableness under the Federal Rules). 
 
439  Oracle II, C 10-03561, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 
2011). 
 
440 See supra notes 305-11 and accompanying text. 
 
441 See id. 
 
442 See, e.g., Why Chatter?, SALESFORCE, https://www.chatter.com/why/ (last visited Nov. 
3, 2013) (discussing the provider’s offering in this regard). 
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confidentiality.  For example, the company could create specific forums or 
groups with limited membership for addressing legal matters or permit 
direct messaging with counsel.  Under either of these scenarios, employees 
would have the benefit of using a social network while the company could 
eliminate site representative access to those communications. 
 
E.  Ensure the Cloud Provider Has Confidentiality Safeguards 
 
[156] An enterprise that is considering cloud computing for its ESI 
storage needs should require that a cloud service provider offers measures 
to preserve the confidentiality of privileged messages.  As the bar 
organization opinions suggest, that may include specific confidentiality 
terms or a separate confidentiality agreement.443  In addition, the provider 
should have certain encryption functionality to better preserve 
confidentiality.  Such functionality—a secure sockets layer connection, 
password hashing, encryption key storage—are all designed to prevent 
unauthorized access by the provider’s employees (or other third parties) to 
company data that is transmitted to and hosted in the cloud.444  By taking 
these measures, counsel and client can better satisfy for themselves that 
they have taken “professionally recognized” and “reasonably appropriate 
steps” to ensure the confidentiality of their privileged discussions.445 
 
F.  Develop and Enforce a Cogent BYOD Policy 
 
[157] To address the nettlesome confidentiality problems associated with 
BYOD, a company should prepare a cogent policy and deploy                                                         
443 See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 
444 See Philip Favro, New Tools for Cost-Effective Information Governance, KMWORLD 
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/White-Paper/Article/New-Tools-for-
Cost-Effective-Information-Governance-77023.aspx (discussing cloud security 
considerations for addressing issues surrounding the privilege). 
 
445 See Jacobs & Laurence, supra note 408. 
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technologies that facilitate employee compliance.446 Such a policy 
discourages workers from using personal cloud storage providers to 
facilitate data transfers or ESI storage.  It also delineates the parameters of 
access to employee devices by the employee’s family, friends, or 
others.447 
 
[158] To make such a policy more effective, employers will need to 
develop a technological architecture that reasonably supports conformity 
with the policy.448  This, in turn, will require the company to provide a 
secure portal to ensure that data transmissions between employee devices 
and employer databases remain confidential.449  Whether that gateway is 
direct or indirect, it should prevent third parties such as cloud provider 
representatives from eavesdropping on privileged communications.  To 
address the other third party access issue, technologies could be 
downloaded to an employee’s personal device to segregate and encrypt 
employer information from personal data.  Such a measure would 
undoubtedly help prevent employee family or friends from accessing 
privileged content. 
 
[159] By training employees on the BYOD policy and providing tools to 
enable their compliance, companies can better prevent unauthorized 
disclosures of counsel’s privileged communications 
 
                                                         
446 Susan Ross, Unintended Consequences of Bring Your Own Device, LAW TECH. NEWS 
(Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202591156823&th
epage=1 (discussing the role of company policy and potential loss of personal 
information stored on a BYOD); see also Hirsch, supra note 420.  
 
447See, e.g., Milam-Perez, supra, note 421. 
 
448 Day, supra note 411 (discussing the challenges of developing BYOD policies and 
infrastructure that can accommodate the variety of consumer operating systems). 
 
449 Id.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
[160] There can be little doubt that the protections afforded by the 
privilege have been substantially diluted for in-house counsel.  Between 
the anvil of heightened scrutiny and the hammer of disruptive 
technologies, the scope of the privilege has been drastically narrowed over 
the past three decades.  Nevertheless, there are ways that organizations can 
prevent the zone of privilege from shrinking even further.  By developing 
actionable and defensible corporate policies, providing suitable training to 
employees, and using technologies to facilitate compliance, companies 
may be able to address some of the corrosive effects of heightened 
scrutiny and technology.  Only by following these suggestions and other 
best practices can clients reasonably expect to counteract these factors that 
are narrowing the scope of their internal lawyers’ privilege claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
